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Since Bain's 1951 pioneering work, considerable effort has been 
devoted to studyingthe relationship between profitability and market 
structure. However, the influence of import competition on the 
structure-performance relationship, and more generally the role of 
international trade in the determination of domestic market performance 
had been for the most part ignored, until the 1970s. 
In recent years, as a result of the increasing importance of 
international trade in all market economies, many studies have been 
undertaken regarding both the theoretical foundations and the appropriate 
empirical specifications for the interface between international trade 
and industrial organization. Four surveys of these studies have been 
made by Lyons (1979), Pugel (1980), Jacquemin (1982), and Caves (1985). 
The major findings of these studies can be summarized as follows. 
It is predicted that, in most cases, as a source of competitive 
discipline, import intensity exerts a negative influence on the domestic 
industrial profitability. (See Pugel (1980), Caves, Porter and Spence 
(1980), Geroski and Jacquemin (1981), and Jacquemin (1982).) Empirical 
results are consistent with theoretical predictions. Negative and 
significant signs are found for import intensity in profit equations 
[Esposito and Esposito (1971), Pagoulatos and Sorensen (1976), Pugel 




However, the effect of export opportunities on market performance is 
much less straightforward. A general presumption is still absent. It 
depends on the ability of domestic sellers in segmenting the domestic and 
world markets, the cost function of domestic producers, the price 
elasticity of demand in both the domestic and world markets, and whether 
or not the domestic market is sheltered. (See White (1974), Caves (1972, 
1973), Pugel (1980), Jacquemin, De Ghellinck and Huveneers (1980), 
Huveneers (1981), and Jaquemin (1982).) Diverging signs with varying 
levels of significance are obtained for export shares. (See Pagoulatos 
and Sorensen (1976), Caves, Porter and Spence (1980), Neuman, Babel and 
Raid (1979), Geroski (1982), Gan and Tham (1977), Pugel (1978, 1980), 
Katrak (1980), and Chou (1986).) 
While many structure-performance studies have been undertaken, the 
vast majority of U.S. studies and all the studies on lesser developed 
countries have tended to focus ort profit studies and ignored the role of 
entry. There is a large body of theoretical literature that suggests 
that a rational policy for oligopolistic firms is the maximization of 
long run profits. In order to achieve this objective the threat from 
entry de novo has to be taken into account. Kamien and Schwartz (1971), 
and Baron (1973), in their dynamic-stochastic models, suggest that the 
fear of entry does play a direct role in oligopolistic firms' profit 
calculations. These firms, according to Kamien and Schwartz, will opt 
for 0 the optimal profits', i.e., profits that are maximized over the long 
run and take into account the signalling effect of prices on potential 
entrants. 
The major objective of this study is to examine the structure-
performance relationship in a small, open, and newly industrialized 
economy--Taiwan, with a particular emphasis on entry. Three specific 
areas will be emphasized in this study: 
1. To complete the specification of the structure-
performance relationship in a small open economy, the influence of 
international trade on industrial profitability should be taken into 
account. The effect of import competition and export opportunities on 
domestic profitability will thus be examined in this study. 
2. Masson-Shaanan's (1982) empirical model of limit pricing is 
applied to examine the structure-performance relationship in Taiwan. 
Such an approach will enable us to examine both the determinants of 
industry profitability and the incentives to enter an industry, and 
overcome some statistical biases of previous studies. 
3. Because of the large role played by government in Taiwan's 
manufacturing sector, it will be interesting to examine the structure-
performance relationship in both the public and private sector and to 
analyze the possible ramifications of differing results. 
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There are several applications of the structure-conduct-performance 
analysis to developing economies (e.g. House (1973, 1976), Sharwani 
(1976), Gan and Tham (1977), Katrak (1980) and Chou (1986)). But Caves, 
Porter and Spence (1980) have warned that economic models appropriate to 
an analysis of U.S. economy are not always applicable to other economies. 
'fe apply a modified version of the conventional structure-conduct-
performance analysis in our study on Taiwan's· manufacturing sector, 
because we believe that (1) Taiwan's economy is basically a market 
economy. It has liberal regulations regarding trade and foreign 
investment and can be described as free-market capitalism with government 
economic control through ownership of some basic industries. 
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(2) Business and government are working together to achieve technological 
goals through research institutes. As a result of the efforts, domestic 
high-tech industries are successfully developed and some American 
companies, such as Wang Laboratories, are now using Taiwan as a 
technological base from which to compete with Japan. So, we think that 
the level of technology in Taiwan's manufacturing sector is closer to 
that of the U.S. than its counterparts in many other developing 
economies. (3) The portion of the U.S's foreign direct investment in 
total foreign direct investment in Taiwan was 35 percent in 1982. 
American firms in Taiwan, as mentioned by Chou (1987), are domestic-
market-oriented, large and capital-intensive. The presence of these 
large U.S. multinationals in Taiwan's manufacturing sector may exert 
certain influence on the domestic market. Therefore, similarity rather 
than disparity between Taiwan's manufacturing sector and manufacturing 
sectors in western industrial economies can be inferred and the 
application of the S-C-P analytical framework on Taiwan's manufacturing 
sector would be appropriate. 
The empirical results of this study can be summarized as follows. 
1. By applying Masson and Shaanan's (1982, 1987) empirical model to 
examine the limit pricing behavior in Taiwan manufacturing industries, we 
find support for limit pricing theory and especially for the 
applicability of the stochastic-dynamic limit pricing model to the 
analysis of the structure-conduct-performance relationship in Taiwan. 
High preentry profit rates attract entry. It is strong explanatory 
factor of entry. The advertising barrier is found to discourage entry. 
Concentration has a significant positive effect on entry, in other words, 
high concentration induces entry. Growth have a positive effect on 
entry. 
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2. Market power (concentration) exerts a strong and positive 
influence on industrial profitability. Entry barriers, especially the 
advertising barrier, enhance industrial profitability. Market growth has 
a positive effect on profits. Imports constrain domestic industrial 
profitability. The effect of exports on domestic industrial 
profitability is not clear. Public enterprises exert a negative 
influence on industrial profitability. 
3. As expected, the advertising barrier and concentration are 
significant explanatory factors in the entry forestalling equation. 
4. In accordance with the predictions of stochastic/dynamic limit 
pricing, optimal profits exceed entry forestalling profits. Both rise 
with entry barriers and converge to the short run profit maximizing 
level. 
Empirical results of regressions with alternative functional forms 
and different samples show that our findings are not highly sensitive to 
sample selection and forms of model specification. These results are 
listed in the Appendix. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES 
This chapter is devoted to a presentation of the major theoretical 
and empirical studies in five areas of Industrial Organization upon which 
our study is based; (1) Performance structure studies; (2) Theoretical 
and empirical studies of the effect of international trade on domestic 
industrial profitability; (3) Theoretical studies of the theory of limit 
pricing; (4) Empirical studies dealing with entry; and (5) Empirical 
studies of the theory of limit pricing. 
Performance-Structure 
A large number of empirical studies have investigated the structure-
performance relationship.! We survey only a few of these studies. 
Bain's (1951) pioneering article dealt with the relationship between 
seller concentration and industrial profitability. A positive 
relationship between the two variables was found. Later [see Bain 
(1956)], Bain extended his study by including entry barrier variables in 
the structure-performance relationship for the years 1936-1940 and 
1947-1951 and found a positive effect of concentration on profits for 
each level of entry barriers. The relationship was found to be 
significant when barriers were high. 
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Similar results were found by Mann (1966) when he repeated Bain's 
analysis for the years 1950-1960. Weiss (1971) applied regression 
analysis to Bain and Mann's data and confirmed their findings. 
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George (1968) extended Mann's (1966) study by adding a growth 
variable. He regressed profit rates on concentration, entry barriers and 
growth and found that these variables significantly affected profits. 
Comanor and Wilson's study (1967) revealed that as a proxy for 
product differentiation, advertising has a positive and significant 
effect on profits. Other explanatory variables included in their 
multiple regression analysis (economies of scale, capital requirements 
and growth) were also found to be significant in the determination of 
industrial profitability. 
Weiss (1974) surveyed major concentration-profits studies from 
several countries--for the years from 1936 to 1970. He notes that the 
majority of these studies show a positive and significant effect of 
concentration on profits. 
While the majority of studies found a positive and significant 
relationship between concentration and profit rates and therefore 
supported the market power hypothesis, Demsetz (1973) argued, however, 
that firms with superior efficiency will tend to be large firms and have 
high profits. High profits are actually caused by better efficiency, not 
by market power. The fact that high profits generally appear in 
concentrated industries is not because high concentration (market power) 
cause profits, but rather because superior efficiency causes both. 
Stigler (1963) and Brozen (1971) and several other studies found no 
evidence of a positive relationship between the two variables for certain 
time periods. 
While the four-firm concentration ratio is used as a structural 
variable in many structure-performance studies this is due to data 
availability. There is no theoretical justification for using four 
firms. Kwoka (1978) tried various market share variables and 
concentration variables in profit equations and found that: (i) the size 
distribution of sellers is indeed an important determinant of industry 
profitability, (ii) the two largest market shares are generally decisive 
for industry profits, (iii) the explanatory power of profit equations 
will increase if detailed distributional traits are used. 
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Most empirical studies of structure-profitability relationship 
employed single-equation models and ignored the simultaneity problem. 
Strickland and Weiss (1976) estimated a three-equation model in which 
price-cost margins, seller concentration and advertising intensity are 
simultaneously determined for 408 four-digit U.S. industries in 1963. It 
is found that concentration and advertising intensity are not significant 
determinants of price-cost margins. Martin (1979) noted an econometric 
error in SW's. He extended and improved SW's model and estimated it by 
three-stage least squares estimation technique for a sample of 209 u.s. 
industries in 1967. Concentration was found to have a positive but 
insignificant effect on price-cost margins. 
Geroski (1982) discusses simultaneous estimation and suggests a 
simple test for exogeneity which was developed originally by Engle, 
Hendry and Richard (1979). He applied the test to a sample of 52 U.K. 
industries. He finds that simultaneity exists between profits and two 
international trade variables, i.e. imports and exports. 
International Trade 
In addition to the traditional aspects of market structure and 
behavior in the structure-performance analysis, one important aspect 
which has been examined by many studies recently is the role of 
international trade. 
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We will survey some of these studies which investigate the effect of 
imports and exports on the domestic industry profits. 
Import Competition 
It is expected that imports which represent the entry of foreign 
suppliers would increase the number of suppliers and total sales volume 
in the domestic market and therefore reduce the sellers' concentration in 
the market. A lower seller concentration would lead to a more 
competitive price. 
It is also anticipated that the existence of actual and potential 
foreign competition may constrain the domestic price to an entry 
forestalling level which is closer to the competitive price. Therefore, 
imports are generally expected to exert a negative influence on 
industrial profitability. 
Rigorous models which include interactions between imports, market 
structure and industry conduct were constructed by Pugel (1980), 
Jacquemin (1982) and Geroski and Jacquemin (1981) to demonstrate the 
effect of imports on domestic market performance. 
Pugel (1980) formulates a model to show the negative relationship 
between imports and domestic price-cost margins and the interactions 
between imports and the structural variables. Assuming that, 
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(i) imports and domestic products are differentiated, (ii) the domestic 
supplier is a monopolist, (iii) the monopolist is assumed to maximize his 
profit, (iv) foreign suppliers are competitive, and solving for the first 
order condition of the monopolist's profit equation, the profit 
maximizing price-cost margin can be obtained as 




pd PdQd Ems 
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( Edd Emm - Edm E d)/E )] + 1, ( • E*) + 1 (2.1) m ms 
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where PCMd is the domestic price-cost margin, 
E is own price elasticity of demand for the domestic product, 
mm 
Edd is own price elasticity of demand for the imported product, 
Emd and Edm are cross-price elasticity of demand, 
E is the price elasticity of the supply of the imported good, 
ms 







is the import share. 
PdQd 
He·further demonstrates that, PCMd varies between zero (the profit 
in a perfectly competitive market) and the monopoly value according to 
the state (S) of competition in the domestic market, 
( 1 + E* • ) . s (2.2) 
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Assuming a multiplicate interaction between structure variables in 
deciding the state of competition, equation (2.2) can be written as 
(1 + E* • ) . 
where b. are positive parameters, 
l. 
CR4 is producer concentration, 
B. are entry barriers. 
l. 
It is shown, in equation (2.3), that in oligopolistic markets, 
import shares interact with market structure variables in the 
determination of the industry price-cost margins and have a negative 
influence on profit rates. 
(2.3) 
Interactions between imports and market structure have been included 
in Pugel's (1980) model, but the industry conduct which is important is 
ignored. Jacquemin (1982) took into account the industry conduct in his 
model. He assumed a Cournot case with n non-collusive domestic 
oligopolistic producers and solved for the first order condition for 
profit maximization for each firm. The maximizing condition obtained by 
Jacquemin, at the industry level, is 
Ld 
Hd 
(1 - t ) (2.4) 
Ed m 
where Ld is the Lerner index for the industry, 
Hd is the Herfindhal index, 
t is the rate of import, m 
Ed is the elasticity of industry domestic demand. 
If MC = AC = constant, then Ld = PCM. The rate of import has a 
negative relationship with the price-cost margins and it interacts with 
concentration in determining Ld (i.e. PCM). 
Geroski and Jacquemin (1981) varied the definition of the dominant 
cartel and industry conduct and derive different conclusions about the 
influence of imports on industry profits. 
12 
When it is assumed that the domestic market forms the cartel and the 
foreign producers are treated as the competitive fringe, a negative 
influence on profits is found as expected by other theorists. But in the 
opposite case, when it is assumed that foreign producers who do not 
produce in the country in question form the cartel and domestic producers 
are the competitive fringe, the direction of the competitive discipline 
is reversed. Thus the more imports the weaker the discipline is. 
Consequently, imports are expected to have a positive influence on 
domestic profits in this case. 
They further assume that in a mixed case when the cartel and the 
competitive fringe are composed of both domestic and foreign producers. 
No clear expectation about the relation between imports and industrial 
profitability can be found. 
Several empirical studies confirm that the imports' share of 
domestic market sales exerts a negative influence on industry 
profitability. 
Esposito and Esposito (1971) and Pagoulatos and Sorensen (1976) 
found that the level of imports has a significant and negative effect on 
industry profitability. 
Interactions between imports and structural variables and the 
negative effect of imports on domestic industrial profitability are 
confirmed empirically by Pugel (1980), Turner (1980), and Jacquemin, 
De Ghellinck and Huveneer (1980). 
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Pugel (1980) extended his previous study on U.S. manufacturing 
industries and showed that the imports variable interacts with seller 
concentration and entry barriers in determining profit margins. Turner 
(1980) examined the influence of import competition on the profitability 
of 32 U.K. manufacturing industries. He confirmed Pugel's finding that 
the effect of import competition is greater in highly concentrated 
industries. Jaquemin, De Ghellinck and Huveneer (1980) estimated a 
two-equation model of Belgian manufacturing industries in which seller 
concentration and price-cost margins are both determined by international 
and domestic variables. They found interactions between imports and 
seller concentration and also a negative effect of import competition on 
profit margins. 
Export Opportunities 
We lack a general presumption about the effect of exportson industry 
profits. Any change in the following conditions would alter the 
direction of the effect of exports on profits: (i) the ability of 
domestic firms to practice price discrimination between domestic and 
foreign markets, (ii) the demand elasticity in both markets, 
(iii) domestic producers' cost functions, and (iv) whether or not the 
domestic market is sheltered. 
Based on Pugel (1980) and Jacquemin's (1982) analysis we present 
some cases suggested by them to help determine the effect of export 
opportunities on industry profits. 
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Case 1. If the domestic producers cannot segment the domestic 
market and the world market and they have no market power in the world 
market, then they would become price takers in the competitive world 
market. Openness to the world market would constrain the domestic price-
cost margin to the competitive level. 
Case 2. If domestic producers cannot segment the markets, but 
obtain some monopoly power in the world market. The inability to segment 
markets and the existence of foreign competitors would still compell the 
domestic producers to set a more competitive price in both markets. 
Case 3. If markets can be segmented, but the demand in the world 
market is more elastic. Domestic producers would dump in the world 
market. The lower world market margin would be averaged with the higher 
domestic margin, hence the export sales would depress the averaged 
margin. 
Case 4. If markets can be segmented, and the demand in the world 
market is less elastic, export sales would expand the average price-cost 
margin. 
Case S. Other things being equal, exporting may lead to a reduction 
in the products' unit cost by spreading fixed costs over large production 
volumes. This reduction in the unit cost may be more than enough to 
compensate for a depressed world market price and thus enhance 
profitability. 
The empirical results of previous studies are mixed. While 
Pagoulatos and Sorensen (1976), Gan and Tham (1977), and Neumann, Babel 
and Raid (1979) reported a negative relationship between exports and 
profit rates, Katrak (1980), Pugel (1980) and Geroski (1982) found a 
positive influence of exports on profitability. 
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Pagoulatos and Sorensen {1976) applied the multiple regression 
analysis to a sample of 88 U.S. manufacturing industries and found that 
in most cases the coefficient of the export share variable was negative 
but it was never significant. Gan and Tham (1977) tested a model which 
includes structure variables, international trade variables and a foreign 
direct investment variable for a sample of forty-two Malaysian 
manufacturing industries. Evidence indicated a negative effect of export 
shares on profitability. Neumann, Bobel and Raid (1979) investigated 
the determination of the mean rates of return of West German industries 
for the years 1965 to 1973. It was reported that exports reduce 
profitability. 
Several other studies found evidence of a positive relationship 
between exports and profit rates. Pugel's (1980) evidence suggested that 
exporting tends to enhance profitability. Katrak (1980) examined the 
effect of industry concentration, foreign trade and protection on 
price-cost margins in Indian manufacturing industries. His evidence led 
him to conclude that the margins are higher in industries with relatively 
higher exports. Geroski (1982) used a nonlinear specification for the 
relationship between profits and concentration and treated imports and 
exports as endogenous variables. His results showed a very strong 
positive effect of exports on the profit margins. 
Theoretical Studies on Limit Pricing 
Conventional microeconomic theory predicts that existing firms in 
oligopolies would adopt a pricing policy which maximizes short run 
profits and positive economic profits would induce entry. Bain (1949, 
1956) and Labini (1962) introduced the theory of limit pricing and 
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suggest that in a concentrated industry with substantial entry barriers, 
existing firms would adopt a limit pricing policy which will entail a 
lower rate of return than the short run profit maximizing rate in order 
to deter entry. It is believed that firms adopt this limit pricing 
policy because they think, in the long run the profits from a limit 
pricing policy are greater than the profits from the myopic short run 
profit maximizing policy. Four specific entry barriers were introduced 
by Bain (1956): (1) Economies of scale; (2) Capital requirements; 
(3) Product differentiation; and (4) Absolute cost advantage. 
Modigliani (1958) showed that the level of the limit price is 
determined by: (1) the absolute market size; (2) the price elasticity of 
demand; and (3) the minimum optimal scale in absolute terms. It was 
demonstrated that the minimum optimal scale has a positive effect on the 
limit price and the absolute size of the market exerts a negative 
influence on it. The more elastic the demand curve is the lower the 
limit price would be. 
Models mentioned above are static models in which existing firms are 
expected to use one of the two extreme pricing policies: (1) to price at 
the short run profit maximizing level and let entry erode future profits 
and (2) to price at the entry forestalling level to deter all entrants. 
Gaskins (1971) in his dynamic/deterministic model assumes that entry 
is a function of the difference between the actual price and the entry 
forestalling price. 
When barriers are low, firms would price at a higher than entry 
forestalling level and as entry barriers become higher, the price will 
decline and converge to the entry forestalling level. After this point, 
price will rise with entry barriers and converge to the short run profit 
maximizing level. Gaskins proved that the optimal price level will 
always be lower than the short run profit maximizing price and higher 
than or equal to the entry forestalling price. 
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Kamien and Schwartz (1971) and Baron (1973) constructed 
stochastic/dynamic limit pricing models where existing firms are expected 
to charge an "optimal price" which is lower than the short run profit 
maximizing level but higher than the entry forestalling level. 
Recently, the "rational limit pricing" models, developed by Milgram 
and Roberts (1982), Saloner (1982) and Matthews and Mirman (1983), 
discuss the effect of information on incumbents' pricing policy. 
Previous limit pricing theory considered only the incumbents' behavior 
without studying the potential entrants' rational reactions to limit 
pricing. The "rational limit pricing" models take into account behavior 
of both sides and analyze equilibrium behavior when there are information 
asymmetries. It is expected that incumbents anticipating entry behave 
like the firms in the stochastic/dynamic models. 
Entry 
Few empirical studies have dealt with entry. Mansfield (1962) 
investigated four U.S. industries: the steel, petroleum, rubber tire and 
automobile industries. He defined entry as number of firms that entered 
and survived until the end of a certain period as the proportion of the 
original number of firms and then regressed it on profitability and a 
capital requirement variable. The results indicated that entry is 
positively related to profits and negatively related to capital 
requirements. McGuckin (1972) defined entry as the percentage change in 
the number of firms in an industry over a given time period and found a 
negative relationship between entry and concentration. 
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Harris (1973) used a sample which consists of 48 4-digit industries 
and regressed seven different measures of entry on entry barriers. His 
findings revealed that product differentiation and economies of scale had 
a negative influence on the number and market shares of entrants. The 
profit rate was the strongest explanatory variable of entry. Growth also 
has a positive influence on entry. The capital requirement variable did 
not have a significant effect on entry. He also found that entry lowered 
leading firms' profit rates. 
Orr (1974) presented a model which consists of two equations, the 
entry equation and the long run profit equation, to examine the 
determinants of entry into Canadian manufacturing industries for the 
years 1963-1967. The entry measure employed in his study is based on the 
number of entrant firms beyond a given size. Capital requirements, 
advertising intensity and high concentration were found to be significant 
barriers to entry. Research and development intensity and risk were 
modest barriers. Past profit rates and past industry growth had a 
positive influence on entry. Berry (1975) employed two measures of 
entry and exit in his study: one based on the estimated market share and 
the other used the absolute number of firms. The two measures of entry 
were regressed on concentration, value of shipments, growth and an index 
of diversification to examine the determinants of entry and exit for 461 
large corporations into 4-digit industries. It was found that there was 
nosignificant relationship between entry and industry concentration. 
Berry was unable to distinguish between entry de novo and entry by 
aquisition. 
Duetsch (1975) used the percentage change of firm numbers, in 134 
4-digit industries in the years of 1958-1963 and 307 industries in the 
1963-1967 time period, as a measure of entry. Diversification and 
product promotion were found to be effective entry barriers. 
Concentration and growth were positively related to entry. 
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Gorecki (1975) examined the entry into U.K. manufacturing industries 
for the period 1958-1963 by using two measures based on the absolute 
number of firms: (1) number of firms whose main line of production was 
outside the specific industries and (2) "specialist" firms, enterprises 
classified to the particular industries. His main finding was that 
growth exerts a strong influence on entry. 
Khemani and Shapiro (1984) explored alternatives in specifying and 
estimating the entry equation. It was found that the semi-logarithmic 
specification is the most appropriate for single-equation estimation. 
Based on the semi-logarithmic specification, and employing a more 
appropriate definition of entry it was confirmed that economies of scale, 
investments in advertising and high capital requirement are entry 
barriers. Concentration and high tariff also deter entry. These results 
suggest that in the certain time period De novo entry was unlikely to be 
a major source of deconcentration in Canadian manufacturing industries. 
Shapiro and Khemani (1987) examined empirically the hypothesis that 
there is a symmetrical relationship between entry and exit barriers. A 
considerable degree of symmetry between barriers to entry and barriers to 
exit is observed. Both entry and exit are deterred in industries where 
the minimum efficient plant size and capital requirements are high and 
where multi-plant firms are prevalent. The results suggest that de novo 
entry is unlikely to be a source of significant short term 
deconcentration. Entry is deterred in highly concentrated industries. 
Empirical Studies of the Theory of Limit Pricing 
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There are only a few empirical studies on the limit pricing theory 
in 1960s and early 1970s. Osborne (1964) examined three industries and 
denied the existence of limit pricing. Mann, Haas and Walgreen (1965) 
challenged Osborne's findings. Blackstone (1972) found that Xerox 
adopted the type of pricing predicted by the stochastic/dynamic models. 
Kamerschen (1968) tested Bain's theory of limit pricing and the 
alternative based on Stigler's theory and found that Stigler's theory is 
more appealing. 
These studies investigated only the existing firms' side and did not 
offer a direct test for limit pricing. 
Masson and Shaanan (1982) constructed an empirical model for the 
simultaneous determination of both profits and entry. In their model the 
existence of entry barriers can be tested from the entry side. 
The entry forestalling profit equation can also be derived from the 
entry equation. The entry forestalling profit rate is distinguished from 
the optimal profit rate which is derived empirically from the actual 
profit equation (the existing firms' side). By comparing and testing the 
entry forestalling profit equation and the optimal profit equation, the 
validity of alternative limit pricing theories can be tested. 
Applying regression analysis to a sample of 37 u.s. manufacturing 
industries, they find support for the theory of limit pricing and the 
dynamic/stochastic version in particular. 
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Masson and Shaanan (1986) also constructed an empirical model of 
oligopoly capacity and pricing decisions and of entrant responses. They 
applied this model to a sample of 26 industries. Their empirical results 
support limit pricing and suggest that limit pricing firms may raise 
their limit prices if there exists unintended excess capacity. There is 
no evidence to support the hypothesis that oligopolies deliberately 
install excess capacity to deter entry. 
Masson and Shaanan (1987) examine limit pricing behavior in Canadian 
manufacturing industries. Their results are again supportive of the 
stochastic/dynamic limit pricing models of Kamien and Schwartz (1971) and 
of Baron (1973). 
ENDNOTE 
1see Leonard w. Weiss, "The Concentration-Profits Relationship 
and Antitrust," in Harvey J. Goldschmid et al., Eds., Industrial 
Cortcentration: The New Learning (Boston: Little Brown, 1974), 
PP• 201-220; Leonard w. Weiss, "Quantitative Studies of Industrial 
Organization," in Michael D. Intriligator, Ed., Fronties of Quantitative 
Economics (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1971), pp. 362-411; and John M. 
Vernon, Market Structure and Industrial Performance: A Review of 
Statis1(ical Findings (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972). 
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CHAPTER III 
I.O. IN THE CONTEXT OF TAIWAN'S ECONOMY 
Taiwan is an "island economy." It has very few natural resources 
and is highly dependent on exports and imports. The trade dependency of 
the Taiwan economy grew significantly over the past three decades. The 
percentage of exports in GNP increased from 9 percent in 1952 to 50 
percent in 1979, that of imports, from 15 percent to 46 percent. In 
1982, Taiwan's two-way trade amounted 45.7 billion dollars; exports were 
24.2 billion and imports totaled 21.5 billion. A third of the Republic 
of China's exports go to the United States. In more recent years, Taiwan 
has been the sixth or seventh leading trading partner of the United 
States and the twentieth or twenty-first largest trading country in the 
world. 
Led by the rapid growth of exports, the Republic of China has 
experienced one of the world's fastest economic growth. Real gross 
national product grew at a high annual rate of 9.2 percent on the average 
over the past three decades and doubled every seven years after 1963. 
The rapid growth was characterized by a relatively higher growth in the 
industrial sector. As a result of industrialization the economy has 
shifted from agriculturally oriented to industrially oriented production 
and raised to a improved status with much higher average productivity. 
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The rapid growth was accompanied by the emergence of many large 
scale private enterprises and enterprise groups. As a result, Taiwanese 
manufacturing industries have become rather concentrated since the 1970s. 
Entry is not blockaded in most Taiwanese industries, except some which 
are monopolized by the government. Evidence provided by Chou (1986), Hsu 
(1986) and Yu (1986) shows that the minimum efficient scale barriers and 
advertising barriers may exist in Taiwan's manufacturing industries. 
A distinguished characteristic of most less developed economies is 
the large presence of public enterprises in the industrial sector. 
Taiwan, with no exception, has many public enterprises. These public 
enterprises accounted for around 15 percent of total sales, 19.2 percent 
of gross value added, and 29.4 percent of total working capital in the 
manufacturing sector in 1976. The existence of these public enterprises 
probably affects the structure and consequently the performance of 
Taiwan's industries. 
With the above facts, we think that a complete model of the 
structure-conduct-performance relationship in Taiwan's economy needs to 
include imports, exports, growth, government participation, industrial 
concentration and entry barriers as independent variables to explain the 
inter-industry variation of profit rates and entry rates. We will 
discuss these variables briefly in the following sections. 
Imports 
In an open economy, imports from foreign countries will constrain 
domestic market power and result in more competitive prices in the 
domestic market. As with the effect of imports on domestic market 
performance, the existence of a competitive world market tends to compel 
domestic producers to be more competitive in pricing, if they cannot 
discriminate between domestic and foreign markets. Since Taiwan is 
highly dependent on imports and exports, we regard them as structural 
characteristics and will examine their effect on the S-C-P relationship 
in Taiwan's manufacturing industries. 
Following two sections are a brief discription of imports and 
exports in Taiwan's economy. 
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In the early 1950s, the government made a great effort to encourage 
substitution of imports to improve the balance of payments and to 
stimulate industrialization. The capital goods and raw materials 
required for the substitution policy had to be imported from foreign 
countries. Hence, in the early years the total import value of those 
goods increased rapidly. Later, the increasing population and national 
income accelerated the increase of imports. The degree of dependence on 
imports increased from 19.14 percent in 1956 to 46.35 percent in 1976. 
The total value of imported industrial product was 27.2 percent of the 
total sales in manufacturing industries in 1976. This reveals a high 
import content in the manufacturing sector. 
Taiwan has a protectionist policy regarding imports. The government 
ensures that domestic industries will have sufficient unit sales to lower 
the unit cost of export products. Therefore, high customs duties are 
imposed on imported products. The government also monopolizes the 
importation of alcoholic beverages and tobacco products. 
With the advent of large trade surpluses during 1976-1979 (the trade 
surplus of 1978 in fact was 6.2 percent of GNP), and the resulting 
concern about monetary effects and price stability, the government has 
taken various import liberalization measures. 
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Exports 
Taiwan's manufactured products are dependent on the world market due 
to the small domestic market. As internal markets became increasingly 
limited and the need for foreign exchange earnings increased there was a 
shift in policy to export promotion in the early 1960s. 
Exports as a percentage of GNP increased from 18.64 percent in 1966 
to 49.81 percent in 1976. In ten years the percentage of exports more 
than doubled. Export expansion has become an important source of growth 
for national income expansion and manufacturing. In the period 
1971-1976, export expansion accounted for 80.6 percent of the 
manufacturing output growth. Moreover, in 1976, 37.6 percent of the 
total sales in manufacturing sector were derived from exports. 
With the transformation of the economic structure, the composition 
of exports has also changed. Exports of agricultural products decreased 
from 92 percent of total exports in 1952 to 9 percent in 1979, while 
exports of industrial products increased from 8 percent to 91 percent. 
In 1952, rice and sugar accounted for 74 percent of total exports, 
however, rapid industrialization in the 1960s brought this share down to 
3 percent in 1970. 
Economic Growth 
The Republic of China has had one of the world's fastest economic 
growth. An important source of the rapid growth in the 1960s and 1970s, 
was the U.S. military and economic aid to the Republic of China. U.S. 
economic aid to Taiwan, amounting to 1.5 billion dollars began in 1950 
and ended in 1956. This money was used very effectively by Taiwan's 
government and this set the stage for the subsequent fast rate of 
economic growth. 
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At the close of World War II, per capita income in Taiwan was about 
$70 (U.S.). Since then per capita income has increased rapidly reaching 
$2280 by 1980. The average rate of growth of real GNP was 9.2 percent in 
the past three decades. It doubled every seven years after 1963. As a 
result, real GNP in 1980 was eleven times the real GNP of 1952. The 
growth of the manufacturing sector was also impressive. By 1976 the 
total revenues in the manufacturing sector was more than 380 percent 
higher than in 1970. 
Rapid growth of market demand should affect industry profits and 
entry. Therefore, we will also take into consideration effects of growth 
on the S-C-P relationship in Taiwan's economy. 
Industrialization 
As a result of rapid industrialization in the past three decades, 
the structure of Taiwan's economy, especially the structure of Taiwan's 
manufacturing sector had become rather similar to those of some western 
economies. This in part justifies our application of the S-C-P 
analytical framework to Taiwanese manufacturing industries. 
Taiwan's economic structure changed appreciably over the past three 
decades. During 1952-1979, the share of agriculture in gross domestic 
product dropped from 32 percent to 9 percent while the share of 
industrial sector rose from 22 percent to 52 percent. The 
industrialization of Taiwan's economy, in the 1960s, was characterized by 
the rapid expansion of labor-intensive light manufacturing, especially of 
the food processing, textile and electrical machinery industries. After 
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1971, the share of the three industries in manufacturing expansion 
started to decline. Instead, more capital- and skilled-intensive 
industries, such as petrochemicals, metals and machinery, had relatively 
greater share in manufacturing expansion. The emphasis has shifted from 
labor-intensive light manufacturing to more capital- and 
skilled-intensive manufacturing. 
Public Enterprises 
In the early 1950s more than 50 percent of Taiwan's industrial 
output was produced by public enterprises, a consequence of the Chinese 
takeover of Japanese assets at the end of world War II. During the early 
1950s, the government began transferring four public enterprises to 
private ownership: Taiwan Cement Corporation, Taiwan Pulp and Paper 
Corporation, Taiwan Industrial and Mining Corporation, and Taiwan 
Agriculture and Forestry Development Corporation. In 1953, large parts 
of government assets were transferred to private owners under the 
land-to-tiller program. 
As a result of the transfer and the rapid growth of private 
industry, in 1964 the government share of total industrial production 
fell to 43.7 percent in 1964. But the government still owned or 
dominated industries which are considered to be of vital economic or 
strategic importance. Industries remaining in the public sector included 
utilities, railroads, shipbuilding, and iron and steel. Therefore, 
despite a substantial decrease in public ownership, public enterprises 
continued to be important. Unfortunately, many of these firms were 
initially plagued with problems of public enterprises such as 
inefficiency, overstaffing, rigid pay structures, and bureaucratic 
interference. 
Because of their inherent chracteristics and the important role in 
Taiwanese economy, public enterprises are expected to have an effect on 
market performance. We thus include a variable for government owned 
firms in our analysis to examine its effect on industry profitability. 
Industrial Concentration 
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Industrial concentration is a conventional structure variable. It 
has been included in most S-C-P models as a proxy of market power. 
Evidence provided by Hsiao (1980) and Chen (1982) calls for the inclusion 
of a concentration variable in a S-C-P model of Taiwan. 
The analysis of industrial concentration in Taiwan's manufacturing 
sector in 1976, conducted by Hsiao (1980), reports that there were 14 
industries with a higher than 80 percent four-firm concentration ratio in 
Taiwan's manufacturing sector, or 10.7 percent of the total number of 
manufacturing industries. This compares with 6 percent in the U.S. but 
16.5 percent in the U.K. In the same year, 46 industries had an above 
50 percent concentration ratio, comprising 35.1 percent of total 
manufacturing industries. It is higher than U.S.'s 31.7 percent but 
lower than U.K.'s 45.4 percent (see Table I.) These figures show that 
Taiwanese manufacturing industries are rather concentrated. 
It is reported by Chen (1982) that in 1976 there were 69,517 firms 
in Taiwan's manufacturing sector of which 89 are public enterprises and 
69,428 are private companies. 
TABLE I 
THE COMPARISON OF INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION BETWEEN 
TAIWAN, USA, AND UK 
Taiwan (1976) USA (1972) UK (1973) 
Number of Number of Number of 
Concentration Industries % Industries % Industries 
Above 90 10 7.6 6 3.3 10 
80-89.9 4 3.1 5 2.7 15 
70-79.9 5 3.8 10 5.5 13 
60-69.9 11 8.4 15 8.2 11 
50-59.9 13 9.9 22 12.2 20 
40-49.9 19 14.5 27 14.8 26 
30-39.9 20 15.3 29 15.8 27 
20-29.9 26 19.9 35 19.1 14 
10-19.9 18 13.7 28 15.3 14 













Total 131 100.0 183 100.0 152 100.0 
Source: Feng-Hsiung Hsiao, "Measuring and Analyzing the Industrial 
Concentration: Republic of China," Monthly Journal of the Cit:y: 
Bank of TaiEei, Vol. 13 (1980), P• 46. 
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The share of total assets of the largest 100 private firms in the 
manufacturing sector had increased from 1972's 29.16 percent to 1979's 
44.37 percent while their share in total sales decreased from 26.44 
percent to 25.88 percent. It seems that the aggregate concentration in 
Taiwan's manufacturing sector had increased over time. 
In the 134 manufacturing industries in 1976, Husking, Cleaning, and 
Polishing of Rice Industry had the lowest four-firm concentration ratio 
of 3.96 percent. Tobacco Manufacturing and Petroleum Refineries had the 
highest 100 percent. The average four-firm concentration ratio, 
excluding public enterprises, was 34.47 percent. It is lower than U.S.'s 
39.2 percent in 1972. 
Entry and Barriers to Entry 
Only one study, Hsu (1986) 1 , investigated empirically the 
determinants of entry into Taiwanese manufacturing industries. He found 
that in Taiwan's manufacturing sector, profits, as expected, have a 
positive influence on entry. 
Evidence provided by Hsu (1986) also suggests that minimum efficient 
scale and capital requirements act as entry barriers. But the role of 
product differentiation in the determination of entry is not discussed. 
A negative relationship between concentration and entry is shown in his 
study. The effect of growth on entry into Taiwanese manufacturing 
industries was found to be positive. 
He found a positive but insignificant coefficient for the profit 
variable in the entry equations. He pointed out that in the period 
1971-1976 when the manufacturing sector was expanding rapidly, the 
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strongest incentive of firms to enter an industry may be the expectation 
of future growth and/or future profits of an industry. 
In summary, minimum efficient scale, capital requirement, and high 
concentration are found to be barriers to entry into Taiwanese 
manufacturing industries in the period 1971-1976. A negative but 
insignificant relationship between the level of risk and entry was also 
found. 
Chou (1986) examined the role of foreign trade in the analysis of 
market structure and performance and the determinants of trade intensity 
in a simultaneous four-equation system where profits, import intensity, 
export intensity and industrial concentration are jointly determined. 
He found that, in 1976, public enterprises significantly influence 
industrial profits in a positive direction. Minimum efficient scale and 
concentration are found to affect industry profits positively and 
significantly. Imports and foreign direct investment have a significant 
negative relationship with profits. 
Yu (1986) 2 evaluated the influence of advertising on industry 
profits in Taiwan'smanufacturing industries. Evidence suggests that 
advertising may affect industrial profitabililty in a positive direction. 
Minimum efficient scale variable was not included in his study. 
Concentration and growth were found to affect profit rates positively 
while imports had a negative effect. 
Empirical results provided by previous studies on the S-C-P 
relationship in Taiwan'smanufacturing industries conform with theoretical 
expectations regarding the effects of concentration, minimum efficient 
scale, growth and imports on profits in Taiwan's manufacturing sector in 
certain time periods. 
ENDNOTES 
1He defined entry in 1976-1981 as the change in the number of firms, 
i.e., the number of firms in 1981 minus the number of firms in 1976 and 
employed a semi-logarithmic specification for the single equation 
estimation on a sample of 99 industries. Positive coefficient estimates 
for the profit variable were obtained in all equations. However, these 
estimates are not significant at the 90 percent level. 
2Yu (1986) examined the influence on industry profits of 
concentration, advertising intensity, export intensity, capital labor 
ratio, capital output ratio, and a dummy variable distinguishing light 
industries from heavy industries, in 1981. He used a three equation 
model where profits, concentration and advertising are jointly 
determined. His sample consists of 106 four-digit manufacturing 
industries classified under the Chinese SIC. A positive but 
insignificant advertising coefficient in the profit equation is obtained 
by 2SLS but with the OLS estimation technique the coefficient is 




It is predicted by microeconomic theory that in the long run there 
are no economic profits for firms in perfectly competitive industries. 
But firms in imperfectly competitive industries can earn excess economic 
profits because of the exertion of market power. Therefore, high 
persistent profit rates in some industries can be used as an index of 
monopoly market power and consequently an indicator of the degree of 
monopolistic industry performance. 
It is one of the major goals of industrial organization to relate 
market characteristics to the earning of excess economic profits. 
Accordingly industrial profitability has been related to various market 
structure variables in the structure-conduct-performance analysis. 
Recently several structure-conduct-performance studies have 
introduced international trade variables to account for the greater 
exposure to international influences of modern economies. 
According to limit pricing theories, an additional determinant of 
industrial profitability should be included. It is the effect of the 
threat of entry on firms' pricing behavior. 
Limit pricing models developed by Bain (1949, 1956), Modigliani 
(1958), Sylos Labini (1962), Gaskins (1971), Kamien and Schwartz (1971), 
and Baron (1973), discuss the interactions between potential entry, entry 
barriers, market power, and market price. The common assumption of all 
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these limit pricing models is that firms are maximizing their long-run 
profits--profits of future n periods of time discounted to the present 
value, rather than short run profit maximization. 
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It is believed that in the face of entry, under certain conditions, 
oligopolistic firms would lower their prices to prevent or reduce entry. 
Bain's (1956) static limit pricing model predicts that with low 
entry barriers, a monopolist would maximize his short-run profits, but 
with high entry barriers, he will limit his price to an entry 
forestalling level and this entry forestalling price will rise with 
increases in the height of entry barriers. 
Gaskins' (1971) dynamic deterministic model predicts that when there 
are no barriers the monopolist will charge a short-run profit maximizing 
price. As entry barriers become higher, price will decline to an entry 
forestalling level, beyond that·point, he will charge the entry 
forestalling price which is rising with the height of entry barriers. 
In Kamien and Schwartz's (1971) and Baron's (1973) stochastic/ 
dynamic models, the monopolist's optimal price (the price which maximizes 
his long-run profits or his present value) is always above the entry 
forestalling level when the entry forestalling price is less than the 
short-run profit maximizing price. This optimal price will rise and 
converge to the entry forestalling price as barriers become higher. 
Only, at the point where entry is blockaded by entry barriers, the 
optimal price and entry forestalling price are equal to the short-run 
profit maximizing price. 
We follow the stochastic/dynamic limit pricing model and extend 
Masson and Shaanan's empirical approach to construct our theoretical 
framework, our model will be tested against other models of limit pricing 
and of course the hypothesis that there is no limit pricing behavior at 
all. 
Conventional structure-performance studies have related industry 
profits to characteristics of market structure such as concentration, 
barriers to entry and growth of demand. These structural features are 
sufficient to explain the inter-industry variation in profitability in 
a closed economy. But in an open economy like Taiwan, the role of 
international trade in the determination of domestic market performance 
is important. Therefore, we need to take into consideration the 
influence of international trade on domestic profitability. 
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Since Taiwan is highly dependent on imports and exports, we include 
these two international trade variables, in our model to examine the 
influence of international trade on the structure-conduct-performance 
relationship in Taiwan's manufacturing sector. 
An additional factor that has to be considered in an I. 0. study of 
Taiwan is the effect of public enterprises on industrial profitability. 
In 1976, they dominated more than 10 manufacturing industries and 
had a 16 percent share of total revenues in manufacturing. It is 
therefore important in an empirical study of Taiwan's industries, to take 
this into account and a government participation variable will be 
included in our model. 
The inclusion of these three variables (international trade 
variables and public enterprise) will help adapt the model to the 
specific characteristics and dimensions of Taiwain's industrial 
organization. 
To summarize our model, profitability is hypothesized to be a 
function of market power and market power is a function of market 
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structure, including international influences and potential entry. In 
the face of potential entry an optimal price which maximizes firms' long 
run profits will be chosen as aresult of the interactions between market 
structure, international trade and the threat of entry. It is unlikely 
that either the short run profit maximizing price or the entry 
forestalling price will be adopted by firms, since these are just two 
extreme prices along a continuum. 
To account fully for limit pricing, we need to consider both the 
existing firm side and the potential entrant side in our analysis. 
We assume that the pricing/entry process is recursive that in time 
period t-1 existing firms select an optimal price which maximizes their 
long-run profits and determines an actual profit level in the industry. 
Potential entrants may respond by entering in period t. Recognizing 
the entrants' reaction function, again the existing firms select an 
optimal price in period t and potential entrants may respond by entering 
in period t+1. 
The Existing Firm Side 
The pricing process of incumbents can be illustrated by three 
functions: the entry forestalling profit function, the optimal profit 
function and the actual profit function. We substitute profits for 
prices in the following analysis as is usually the practice in industrial 
organization. The entry forestalling profit rate, for example, 
corresponds to the entry forestalling price. 
It is predicted by Kamien and Schwartz (1971) and Baron (1973) that 
existing firms will optimally set their price at a level between the 
short-run profit maximizing level and the entry forestalling level. In 
other words, the optimal profit rate is nearly always above the entry 
forestalling level. Hence, the optimal profits consists of two 
f components, (1) the entry forestalling profits, nt; and (2) the 
difference between the optimal profits and the entry forestalling 
0 f 
profits, Tit - Tit. 
The optimal profit function can be written in its general form: 
f 0 f 
TI + ( TI - TI ) 
t t t 
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(4.1) 
The entry forestalling profit rate is the highest profit rate that 
existing firms can obtain without inducing entry. It is a function of 
entry barriers, industry growth rate, and industrial concentration ratio. 
It can be written as 




B is a vector of entry barriers (BA,BS), BA is the advertising 
intensity variable, BS is the minimun efficient scale plant 
for an entrant firm, 
GRt is the industry growth rate in period t, and 
Ct is the concentration ratio for the industry in period t. 
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It is demonstrated by the limit pricing theory that entry 
forestalling prices are a function of barriers to entry. The two entry 
barrier variables are thus included in the entry forestalling profit 
function. They are expected to have a positive effect on the entry 
forestalling profit rate. Since growth attracts entry, an inverse 
relationship between growth and the entry forestalling profit rate can 
be expected. This inverse relationship has been shown theoretically by 
Bhagwati (1970). [For other possibilities see Ireland (1972), and for a 
more detailed disscusion on the relationship between entry and growth see 
Masson and Shaanan (1982).] Growth has been found to have a positive 
effect on entry by Harris (1973), Orr (1974), Duetsch (1975), Gorecki 
(1975), and Masson and Shaanan (1982, 1987). 
We assume that high concentration induces entry because potential 
entrants may think that entry into a concentrated industry may be more 
profitable. Hence high concentration would reduce the entry forestalling 
profit rate. 
Statistical results regarding the role of concentration in the 
determination of entry is mixed. Orr (1974) and Masson and Shaanan 
(1987) found high concentration to be a significant barrier to entry 
while Duetsch (1975) found a positive relationship between concentration 
and entry. 
We write the functional form of Dt as 
(4.3) 
where Tt is a vector of international trade variables, (IMPt, EXPt), 
IMPt is the import intensity for the industry in period t, 
EXPt is the export intensity for the industry in period t, 
Gt is the government participation in the industry in period t. 
We expect that international trade variables (imports and exports) 
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have a negligible effect on the incentive to enter and do not affect the 
level of the entry forestalling price significantly. 1 Therefore, Tt is 
not included in the entry forestalling profit function. But it is 
expected that Tt has a direct effect on the optimal profit rate, thus it 
is included in f 2• 
Gt is included in the optimal profit function. We believe that 
public enterprises in Taiwan were initially plagued with problems typical 
to public enterprises like inefficiency, overstaffing, rigid pay 
structures, and bureaucratic interference, and thus operated 
inefficiently with high costs. Therefore, Gt is expected to affect 
optimal profits negatively. 
Traditional market structure characteristics which determine 
industrial profitability, concentration, advertising intensity, economies 
of scale and growth are also included in f 2• 
The presence of Ct, B and GRt in both f 2 and f 1 reflects the dual 
effect of these variables on the optimal profit rate, i.e. besides their 
direct effect on the optimal profit rate, they also affect the optimal 
profit rate indirectly through their effect on the entry forestalling 
profit rate. 
The fourth function to be considered is the actual profit function. 
The actual profit rate, Tia , is basically a function of the optimal 
t 
profit rate. An additional determinant C , industry concentration, 
t 
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should also be included in the function. Ct determines the ability of 
existing firms to collude, thus the feasibility of limit pricing. 
0 a 0 
The actual profits also consists of two components, 1Tt and 1Tt- 1Tt , 
0 
=Tit+Pt 
The functional form of Pt can be written as 
The actual profit function takes the following form 
(4.4) 
(4.5) 
If we assume that f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , f 4 and f 5 are all linear, then in 





a4 + d4 + d8, 
act 




d7" = = 
()EXPt 8Gt arMPt 
We include (Ct - 100) in f 5 because we assume that the optimal 
profit rate will be fully realized by existing firms only when the 
concentration ratio is 100 percent, i.e. 
'!Tat n° + d (C - 100) 
t 8 t 
= 'IT~ + d8 (100 - 100) 
and when Ct is less than 100 percent, the actual profit rate will be 
lower than the optimal profit rate, e.g. 
a 0 
nt = nt + d8 (60 - 100) 
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(4.8) 
where d8 is assumed to be positive and the positiveness of d8 will be 
verified. 
We will see, in the next chapter, that all the coefficients of the 
independent variables in the TI~ and TI~ equations are the same. 
has a higher intercept. 
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The signs of the first derivatives of Tia with respect to the various 
t 
independent variables will be discussed below. 
A. Industry Concentration 
In the 1950s and 1960s, private enterprises in Taiwan were small 
relative to market size and fairly competitive. During the early 1950s, 
the government started transferring some large scale public enterprises 
to private ownership. In the 1960s, government policies encouraged 
private industry by making funds more available to private companies. As 
a result of the transfer, the availability of funds, the rapid growth of 
the economy, and increasing merger activities, large scale private 
enterprises appeared in the 1970s. Taiwanese manufacturing industries 
have become rather concentrated since then and hence there is a 
possibility that monopolistic power is being exerted in some industries. 
Several theoretical studies have shown the positive relationship 
between the level of concentration and industry performance. Stigler 
(1964) stresses the relevance of the Herfindahl index in explaining the 
market performance. Saving (1970) demonstrates that within the confines 
of the competitive fringe or price leadership model, the k-firm 
concentration ratio can be related to both the Lerner index and 
Rothschild index. Cowling and Waterson (1976) demonstrate theoretically 
that the profit-revenue ratiois related directly to the Herfindahl 
index. 
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Not all 1.0. economists agree that high concentration leads to high 
profits and that high concentration is a proxy for collusive action. 
Demsetz (1973) criticized the causal link of concentration, collusion, 
market power and monopoly profits. He argued that firms' superior 
efficiency actually cause both high concentration and high profits and 
this is why both phenomena appear together. 
We follow the "market concentration doctrine" and believe that the 
causal relationship from concentration to monopoly profits exists. We 
expect that high concentration tends to make the collusive agreements 
more effective, and hence enables existing firms to charge a higher 
optimal price and consequently expect that d4 > 0. 
We expect that high concentration ratio will induce entry 
(hypotheses about the effect of industry concentration on entry will be 
discussed in detail later), therefore, an increase in concentration ratio 
is expected to cause a fall in the entry forestalling profit rate, i.e. 
High levels of concentration increase the feasibility of limit 
pricing and lower costs for setting and monitoring agreements. 
Therefore, it is predicted that the direct effect of industry 
concentration on the actual profits is positive, i.e. d8 > 0. 
The total effect of concentration on profits can be written as 
We assume that d4 + d8 > j a4 [ , therefore we expect that 
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B. Advertising Intensity 
Product differentiation is one of the entry barriers, the source of 
this barrier is the loyalty or the preference of buyers for products of 
established firms over new products. Facing this entry barrier, 
potential entrants have to either (i) set a selling price lower than that 
of established firms, and/or (ii) spend a lot of money in promotion 
efforts to overcome the preference for established firms' products. [See 
Bain (1956) and Caves (1972).] Hence, the height of product 
differentiation barrier is positively related to industrial 
profitability. 
Besides the disadvantages of high unit promotion cost and/or lower 
selling prices, entrants may also face the problem of scale economies in 
sales promotion efforts. When sales volume is expanded by large 
promotional efforts firms may enjoy a reduction in unit promotion cost 
resulting from rapid increase in sales volume or efficiency in 
promotional efforts. Therefore, entering firms with smaller sales volume 
and smaller scale of sales promotion activities may suffer the 
disadvantage of high unit promotion cost. [See Bain (1956).] 
Telser (1964), however, believes that advertising is not an entry 
barrier with anti-competitive effects on market performance. Rather, it 
is a mean of entry with pro-competitive effects on market performance. 
We adopt Bain's hypothesis, which will be tested in our study. 
Bain (1956) suggested that sales promotion cost can be used as a 
proxy for the height of the product differentiation barriers. In 
practice, advertising intensity, the ratio of advertising expenditures to 
total sales, is commonly used to approximate intensity of promotional 
efforts. 
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Therefore, as a proxy of product differentiation barrier, 
advertising intensity is expected to have a positive influence on 
profits. 
The total effect of advertising intensity is 
ana ana a o an° a(nf + D ) t t Tit t t t 




aBA a1 + d1 , 




As an entry barrier, advertising intensity deters entry. An 
increase in BA will allow existing firms to set a higher entry 
forestalling price, i.e. a1 > 0. But the optimal profit rate will not 
increase as much, because d1 is expected to be negative. 
It is predicted by Kamien and Schwartz (1971) that TI~ will rise and 
converge to TI~ as barriers become higher. In other words, at higher 
levels, Dt is smaller, i.e. an increase in BA will cause a decrease in 
We thus expect that a 1 > 0, d 1 < 0, but a 1 > \1 1 \, and consequently, 
a1 + d1 > o.3 
C. Minimum Efficient Scale 
If the proportion of the industry output that is needed for a firm 
to gain all economies of scale is large relative to the entire market, 
then a new firm may face three problems: (1) producing at an inefficient 
scale with a higher average cost than existing firms; (2) keeping excess 
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capacity which incurs high capital cost if it enters with optimal scale 
but produces at sub-optimal scale; and (3) the possibility of starting a 
price war which could exacerbate the above two disadvantages. 
The larger the minimum efficient scale is, the harder it is for a 
potential competitor to enter the industry. Therefore, as an entry 
barrier, minimum efficient scale would have a positive effect on 
industrial profitability. Other things being equal, the larger the 
minimum efficient plant size is the higher the entry forestalling price, 
But as discussed in (B), since the minimum efficient scale is an 
entry barrier, it is expected to have a negative effect on the difference 
0 f 
of Tit and Tit , i.e. d2 < 0. 




We expect that a 2 > 0, d 2 < 0, but a> Jd 2 [, therefore, 
a 2 + d 2 > 0. 
D. Growth of Demand 
We can expect that, other things being equal, growth rate of demand 
influences price-cost margins in a positive direction. 
In an industry with rapid growth in sales, (i) existing firms feel 
less competitive pressure, they can maintain their market shares without 
using strategies like cutting prices or increasing promotion costs and 
(ii) the better utilization of excess capacity would reduce the cost, 
hence increase the price cost margins, if they are not at the minimum 
efficient scale. 
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But if the indirect effect of growth on profit rates via the threat 
of entry is accounted for, then the influence of market growth is less 
clear, because if growth attracts entry, (hypothesis about the effect of 
growth on entry will be discussed in detail later), then growth will have 
the effect of lowering entry forestalling profit rate. 
We assume that growth will attract entry and cause a fall in the 
entry forestalling profit rate, i.e. a3 < 0. But the direct effect of 
growth on the optimal profit rate should be positive and greater than the 
indirect effect through the entry forestalling profit rate, i.e. 
dTI~ 
aGRt 
E. Government Participation in 
d3 > la31 • 
Overall, we expect that 
Manufacturing Sector 
Donsimoni and Leoz-Arquelles (1981) suggested that if the government 
takes over inefficient firms or government owned companies charge low 
prices--prices close to the competitive level, a negative effect of 
government ownership on profits can be expected. But if government owned 
companies operate efficiently or adopt high protected prices--prices 
close to the profit maximizing level, as suggested by Aharoni (1980), 
then a positive effect is expected. 
Chou (1985,1986) finds that government owned companies in Taiwan 
adopt a high price policy for fiscal purposes, and this policy is 
protected by government, hence this would suggest a positive effect on 
profits. 
Evidence provided by Lin (1981) reveals that, most of the public 
enterprises in Taiwan are operating inefficiently, for the following 
reasons. 
1. Too many authorities exercise control over a single public 
enterprise. 
Public enterprises belonging to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
for example, are under the control of the following nine government 
offices: Executive Yuan, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of 
Finance, Ministry of Audit, Ministry of Personnel, Examination Yuan, 
Personnel Affairs Bureau, Commission for the Discipline of Public 
Functionaries, and Directorate-General of Budgets, Account and 
Statistics. Bureaucratic interference restricts the administrative 
functions of management in public enterprises. This seems to be the 
major source of operation inefficiency of public enterprises. 
2. Numerous complicated laws related to public enterprises cause 
operation inflexibililty. 
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For example, personnel matters of public enterprises are regulated 
by the following six laws: Public Functionary Appointment Law, Civil 
Service Law, Law of Efficiency Evaluation of Public Functionary, Law of 
Government Employee Salary System, Law of Government Employee Insurance, 
and Law of Public Functionary Retirement. 
3. The personnel system of public enterprises is inefficient. 
Overstaffing is a common phenomenon in all public enterprises. 
Appointments to top management are, in most cases, a plum to 
officials retired from the government. Therefore, most of the public 
enterprises are led by "laymen" and consequently are at a disadvantage 
when they compete with private companies. [See Lin (1981).] 
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4. Public enterprises sometimes bear a heavy burden of accompishing 
non-economic policies. 
For instance, in 1971 the Republic of China was expelled from the 
United Nations. After that, many countries severed diplomatic 
relationships with the Republic of China. R.O.C.'s diplomatic 
relationship with Spain appeared to become unstable at that time. 
Therefore, based on diplomatic considerations, the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Chung-Tai Fertilizer 
Corporation, a public enterprise, to purchase manufacturing equipment 
from Spain even though the equipment was not compatible with Chung-Tai's 
equipment. As a result, Chung-Tai incurred losses for many years. 
Lin (1981) evaluated the operating efficiency of public enterprises 
and found that in the year of 1978 seven of the 14 public enterprises 
under the Ministry of Economic Affairs had a ratio of total liabilities 
over total capital above 70 percent. This shows that these public 
enterprises' financial structure is very inefficient. In the same year, 
in 13 2-digit industries 4 the average working capital turnover rate and 
the average commodity turnover rate of public enterprises were much lower 
than that of private companies. 5 The operating ability of public 
enterprises, in general, was thus found to be lower than that of private 
enterprises. Therefore, it is not surprising that in 1978, in ten 
2-digit industries, the average profit rate of public enterprises was 
lower than private companies. 
Following Lin's (1981) findings, we expect that government 
participation in Taiwan's manufacturing sector has a negative influence 
on industry profit rate. 
dTI~ 
d7 is expected to be negative. act 
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F. Import Competition 
It is suggested that imports which represent the entry of foreign 
suppliers would increase the number of suppliers and total sales volume 
in the domestic market and therefore reduce the seller concentration in 
the market. As discussed in (A), a lower seller concentration would lead 
to more competitive prices. 
Recently, Pugel (1980), Jacquemin (1982), and Geroski and Jacquemin 
(1981) developed more rigorous models which include interactions between 
imports, market structure and industry conduct to demonstrate the effect 
of imports on domestic market performance. 
The basic assumption adopted in all the models is that firms are 
maximizing their profits. Under this assumption, Pugel (1980) developed 
his model to demonstrate the negative effect of imports on industry 
profits. This model can be applied to markets with different degrees of 
market power. Jacquemin (1982) takes into account the domestic 
oligopolists' conduct and still predicts a negative effect of imports on 
profits. Although Jacquemin and Geroski (1981) add some complexity to 
this problem, in most cases a negative effect of imports on industry 
profit can be expected. 
Taiwan has a protectionist policy regarding imports. The nominal 
rate of protection (NRP), weighted by exports, for the manufacturing 
sector as a whole was 0.36 in 1971. The high rate of nominal protection 
reflects a high degree of protection. We can expect that industries with 
lower than average NRPs will have more imports and face a higher level of 
foreign competition. Consequently, in these industries firms would be 
compelled to adopt more competitive prices. Thus we believe that 
in Taiwan's manufacturing sector imports, as a competitive fringe, 
would discipline the domestic market. 
an~ 
------ = ds, is expected to be negative. 
arMPt 
H. Export Opportunities 
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It is not possible to make a general conclusion about the effect of 
export opportunities on domestic market performance, because it depends 
on (i) the ability of domestic firms in segmenting domestic and world 
markets; (ii) the demand elasticity in both markets; (iii) the cost 
function of domestic producers; and (iv) whether or not the domestic 
market is sheltered. Any change in the above conditions would lead to a 
different result. When several changes occur simultaneously the whole 
problem becomes more complex. 
Taiwan's exports include products like textiles, plastic products, 
electronics, footwears, machinery, electrical appliance, toys, cosmetics, 
furniture, handicrafts, sports gear and accessories, metal products and 
agricultural commodities. 
Most of these are labor intensive products. Prices of these 
products in the world market are even more competitive than before 
because new suppliers from other countries are producing at lower wage 
rates than Taiwan. Competition in the world market tends to force 
domestic producers to be more competitive in pricing. 
Since 1960, Taiwan has established three export processing zones at 
Kaohsiung, Nantze, and Taichung. In the export processing zones, firms 
import raw materials and export finished goods without duties or tariffs. 
There are no commodity or sales taxes. Utilities are inexpensive. Labor 
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is supplied at low cost. In these export processing zones, exporting 
firms are sheltered by the government and produce at very low costs. 
Besides, export opportunities enable existing firms to overcome the 
constraint of a limited domestic market size and to attain economies of 
scale and produce at lower costs. 
Exports seem to affect industry profits in opposite ways and hence a 
definite prediction regarding the effect of exports is not possible. 
ana 
----&t_ = d6 , is expected to be either positive or negative. 
8EXPt 
The Potential Entrant Side 
From conventional microeconomic theory we know that profits serve as 
the primary incentive to enter an industry, we therefore hypothesize that 
entry is a function of profits. We can hypothesize that the rate of 
entry into an industry in period t+l is a positive function of the 
difference between the actual profit rate and the entry forestalling 
profit rate in period t. The greater the value of ( na- nf ), the 
t t 
higher the rate of entry. 
We can write the entry function as 
ENTt+l = g ( a f ) TI - TI t t 
where ENTt+l is the rate of entry into that industry in period t, 
a 
8( Tit 
> 0 • 
Since it is formulated in Part A that 




We can write ENTt+l as 
(4.10) 
Assume that g is linear, then in explicit functional form, 
ENTt+l bl ( 
a 0 ) = Tit - Tit 
bl [ 
a 
- (~+ a 1BA + a 2BS + a 3GRt + a4Ct)] = 7T t 
bl [ 
a a BA - a BS - a 3GRt - a4c t] = Tit - ~- 1 2 
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-bla4. oBA = act 





Hence, the sign of b 1 is expected to be positive. 
The two barriers, BA and BS, are expected to deter entry and this is 
indeed the test to determine whether they are barriers. Therefore, they 






Gaskins (1971) assumes that growth has no effect on entry. Kamien 
and Schwartz (1971), Ireland (1972) and Duetsch (1975) assume a positive 
relationship between growth and entry. 
We expect that with rapid growth entrants will face less competition 
from incumbents because they do not need to capture market shares from 
existing firms and hence potential entrants are more likely to enter. A 
positive relationship between growth and entry is expected. 
Industry concentration is not included in Masson and Shaanan's 
(1982, 1987) entry functions. However, alternative hypotheses relating 
to the effect of concentration on the incentive to enter are discussed in 
their 1987 paper. 
One hypothesis predicts that when potential entrants observe high 
profits in less concentrated industries, they may think that an 
"agreement" is the cause of high profits, but this agreement would not 
remain stable when new firms enter. On the contrary, high profits in 
concentrated industries are thought to be caused either by an agreement 
which is effective and will remain stable, post entry, or by the fewness 
of firms in a Nash Equlibrium. Therefore, potential entrants may think 
that it is more profitable to enter a highly concentrated industry. It 
is also predicted by Baron (1973) that potential entrants may think that 
in concentrated industries where only few firms are already in the 
market, entry is less likely to lead to production below the minimum 
efficient scale. Thus they may think that entry into a concentrated 
industry may be more profitable. 
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Another hypothesis leads to an opposite conclusion. It is 
postulated that potential entrants think that existing firms may collude 
to obstruct entry and collusion is impossible in any unconcentrated 
industry. Therefore, they may think that entry into a less concentrated 
industry is more profitable. [See Masson and Shaanan (1987).] 
It is found by Duetsch (1975), however, that more entry occurred in 
concentrated industries than in unconcentrated industries. 
We adopt the first hypothesis and assume that potential entrants in 
Taiwanese manufacturing industries believe that entry into a concentrated 
industry is more profitable. 
Industry concentration is thus expected to have a positive 
relationship with entry. 
ENDNOTES 
1Masson and Shaanan (1987) indicate that the international trade 
variables may have an independent influence upon entry. But they think 
that trade variables should not add significantly to the information 
contained in the profit equation. Respecified entry equations which 
include an import variable and a nominal tariff rate variable were tried 
by them. Results show a significant negative effect of import on entry. 
2A h · 0 · 11 h a · h d · · c ange Ln Tit wL cause a c ange Tit Ln t e same LrectLon. More 
accurately, we should write that an~ 
0 < ---=---- < 1 0 a nO t 
But since the effect of TI~ on TI~ is most likely positive and will not 
ana 
change the sign of a~ , for simplicity we assume 
3rt is hypothesized by the stochastic-dynamic 
that both TI~ and TI~ rise with barriers (al > 0, a1 
to the short run profit maximizing level (d 1 < 0). 
ana 
that __ t_ = 1. 
a nO 
t 
limit pricing theories 
+ d1 > 0) and converge 
4There are 20 2-digit industries in the manufacturing sector. 
Fifteen of these industries have public enterprises. 
5commodity turnover rate = Annual total revenues I Total value of 
inventory at the end of the year. Working capital turnover rate = 
Annual total revenues I Total working capital at the end of the year. 
Profit rate = Total profits I Annual total revenues. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA 
The Empirical Model 
We present our empirical testing model in this chapter. A 
theoretical framework which is based on the stochastic-dynamic limit 
pricing theories of Kamien and Schwartz (1971) and of Baron (1973) was 
developed in the last chapter. Based on our theoretical framework, we 
follow Masson and Shaanan's (1982, 1987) statistical approach to 
construct our empirical testing model. The model is a simultaneous 
equation system which includes an entry equation and an actual profit 
equation. 
This empirical testing model will be applied to test the following 
hypotheses: 
1. Whether preentry profits attract entry. 
2. Whether barriers discourage entry. 
3. Whether optimal profits exceed entry forestalling profits, 
whether both rise with barriers and finally whether they converge at the 
short run profit maximizing level. 
4. Whether market power (concentration) exerts a positive influence 
on industrial profitability. 
5. Whether entry barriers enlarge price-cost margins. 
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6. The effect of market growth on profits and entry. 
7. Whether imports, as a source of competitive discipline constrain 
the domestic price-cost margins. 
8. The effect of market power (concentration) on entry. 
9. Exports, enable domestic producers to overcome the small market 
size in Taiwan and to attain economies of scale, this should lower the 
unit cost of production and enlarge the price-cost margins. 
10. Due to inefficiencies relating to the lack of competitive 
pressure, government controlled enterprises should exert a negative 
influence on industrial profitability. 
The Actual Profit Equation 
In Chapter II, a model is constructed for the existing firm side to 
show the incumbents' limit pricing process. The incumbents' actual 
profit function takes the following form 
(4.6) 
Assuming that f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , f 4 and f 5 are all linear, the explicit 
functional form of TI~ can be written as 
nat (a + d - 100 d8 ) + (a + d ) BA + (a + d ) BS + (a + d ) GR 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 t 
+ (a + d + d ) c + d IMP + d EXP + d G 
4 4 8 t 5 t 6 t 7 t 
(4.8) 
where 
a is the actual profit rate for the industry in period t, Tit 
ct is the four-firm concentration ratio in period t, 
BA is the advertising barrier, 
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BS is the minimun efficient scale barrier, 
GR is the industry growth rate in period t, 
IMPt is the import intensity variable for the industry in period t, 
EXPt is the export intensity variable for the industry in period t, 
Gt is a dummy having the value of one if government owned 
companies account for 50 percent or more of the industry total 
sales. 
The estimating equation for the actual profit equation is 
a 
'ITt ~+ a 1BA + a 2BS + a 3GRt + a4Ct + a 5IMPt + a 6EXP t 
+ a7Gt + E:t (4.12) 
where al = ao + do - 100d8 , 
al = al + dl, 
az az + dz, 
a3 = a3 + d3' 
a4 a4 + d4 + ds' 
as = ds' 
The actual profit rates in period t are determined by industrial 
concentration, two entry barriers, growth, import intensity, export 
intensity and government intervention. 
We can obtain 'IT~ by setting Ct = 100 and solving for 
0 a I nt = Tit ct = 100. 
0 The coefficients of the independent variables in both 'IT and 
t 
functions are identical, but 'ITa is expected to have a higher intercept. 
t 
0 This will be explained in the estimation of 'ITt. 
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The Entry Equation 
An entry reaction function was formulated for the potential entrant 
side to show the entry process. 
The entry reaction function was written as 
(4.9) 
Assuming that g is linear, we can write the explicit functional form 
of g as 
ENTt+1 
where ENTt+1 is the industry rate of entry in period t+1. 
where 






-b 1 a 1, 
-b a 
1 2' 
-b a 1 3, 
b • 
1 
Entry in period t+1 is a function of actual profits, growth, 
(4.11) 
(4.13) 
industrial concentration in period t and two entry barriers. Tia is used 
t 
to present the influence of preentry profits on the incentive to enter. 
Industrial concentration is not included in the entry equation in 
Masson and Shaanan's original model. We include concentration in our 
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entry equation, because we believe that concentration has an influence on 
entry which is additional to the indirect effect of concentration via 
profits. 
In both profit and entry equations, Ct, BA, BS, and GRt are used to 
represent the characteristics of market structure. In the profit 
equation, IMPt and EXPt are used to present the foreign influence on 
domestic market performance. 
The model is recursive and consists of two endogenous variables na 
t 
and ENTt+1• The sufficient condition for identification for equations 
(4.12) and (4.13) is COV[n(t+l), s(t)] = 0. This condition will be 
checked by regressing residuals of equation (4.12) on residuals of 
equation (4.13) and examining the value of the regression coefficient 
and its level of significance. OLS procedure is appropriate for equation 
(4.12) and 4.(13) if the error terms across these two equations are not 
correlated. 
The primary criticism of the conventional single equation estimation 
has been the failure to capture the simultaneous nature of 
interrelationship among structural variables. [See Greer (1971), Comanor 
and Wilson (1974), Phillips (1976), Martin (1979), Scherer (1980) and 
Pagoulatos and Sorensen (1981).] Statistically, the estimation of a 
single equation model when a simultaneous equation model is actually 
needed, will yield biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. The 
problem of simultaneity is therefore of great importance to the 
specification of our profit equation. 
Four possible sources of simultaneity in our profit equation are: 
the simultaneity of profits and (1) advertising, (2) industrial 
concentration, (3) import intensity, and (4) export shares. 
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We intend to test for simultaneity between the four explanatory 
variables and profits in our sample by performing a test which is adopted 
from Wu (1974) and Engle, Hendry and Richard (1979) and has been used in 
an industrial organization study by Geroski (1982). 1 
Heteroscedasticity might be a problem as indicated by Comanor and 
Wilson (1967). We will examine the residuals from each equation to 
decide whether the variance of error terms is constant across industries 
or varies with industry size. If it is a problem, the weighted 
regression will be applied to our samples. [See Comanor and Wilson 
(1967).] 
An interactive model of profit determination which is formulated by 
Pugel (1980) will also be estimated to see whether interactions exist 
between structural variables and international trade variables. 
Estimation of the Entry Forestalling 
Profit Equation 
We derive the entr~ forestalling profit equation from the entry 
reaction equation which was constructed for the potential entrants' side. 
The entry reaction equation is 
(4.11) 
By definition, the entry forestalling profit rate is the rate at 
which no entry occurs, therefore we can set ENTt+1 = 0, and solve 
implicitly to derive the entry forestalling profit equation. 
0 
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Rearrange terms, we have 
Divide both sides of the above equation by -b 1, 
(4.14) 
so -b1a0 
where ao = -- = -s -b 5 1 
s1 -b1a1 
a1 = -- = -s -b 5 1 
Sz -b1a2 
a2 = -- = -s -b 5 1 
s3 -b1a3 
a3 = -- = -s -b 5 1 
s4 -b1a4 
a4 = -- = -s -b 5 1 
Estimation of the Optimal Profit Equation 
Setting Ct 0 a I 100 and solving for Tit = Tit C 100, we have 
(4.15) 
where a1 + d1 
_. 
a = a1 1 
a2 + dz a2 = a2 
_. 
a3 + d3 = a3 = a3 
ds = as = as 
.. 
d6 = a6 = a6 
_. 
d7 = a7 = a7 
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ao = ao + 100a4 
(a0 + d0 + lOOa4 + lOOd4 ) > (a0 + d0 - lOOd 8) = a 0 
2 
Th a · d h 0 · ·d · 1 f h e Tit equat~on an t e Tit equat~on are ~ ent~ca except or t e 





A Test of Limit Pricing 
It is postulated that optimal profits exceed entry forestalling 
profits, both rise with barriers and finally converge at the short run 
profit maximizing level. 
We therefore expect that 
and 
In Chapter III we assumed that entry barriers have a dual effect on 
actual profits. Since we expect barriers to deter entry. The higher the 
barriers are the higher the entry forestalling price. Therefore the 
indirect effect of entry barriers on actual profits through the entry 
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3 t > 0, 
a f Tit 
ClTia 
t c 1. 
ClTIO 
t 
It is mentioned in Chapter III that TI~ will rise and converge to 
Tif as barriers become higher, hence an increase in B will cause a decrease 
t 










where < 0 
ClB 
1. 
Therefore, if our empirical results show that a 1 < a 1, and a 2 < a 2, 
i.e. d 1 < 0 and d 2 < 0, then we can conclude that our empirical evidence 
a is supportive of hypothesis (3) regarding the dual effect of B on Tit. 
Growth and concentration are also expected to have a dual effect on 
actual profits. Since these two variables are assumed to have an effect 
on entry, therefore, in addition to their direct effect on actual 
profits, they have an indirect effect on actual profits through entry 
forestalling profits. 
In Chapter III, we hypothesized that growth attracts entry and cause 
a fall in the entry forestalling profit rate, therefore the indirect 
a effect of GRt on Tit is negative 
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< 0 
and the direct effect is assumed to be positive 
dTTa d 0 
t TTt 
> 0 















The total effect of growth on actual profits is a3 + d3 = a 3 • 
Concentration is assumed to induce entry and have a negative effect 
on the entry forestalling profit rate. The indirect effect of 
concentration on actual profits through the entry forestalling profit 
rate is therefore assumed to be negative 
< 0 • 
High levels of concentration tend to make collusion more effective 
and lower costs for setting and monitoring collusive agreements. 
Therefore the high~r the level of concentration the smaller the 
difference between TT~ and TT~, i.e. the closer the actual profit rate is 
to the optimal profit rate. 






The total effect of Ct on Tit is a4 + d4 + d8 = a 4 • 
Therefore, if a3 > 0, a 4 > 0, a3 ~ 0 and a4 ~ 0, then our results 
a 
support the hypotheses regarding the dual effect of GRt and Ct on Tit• 
We can summarize our expected results as following: (i) a1 ~ a 1 , 
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a2 ~ a2, al > o, a2 > o, and ao > ao would jointly support the theory of 
limit pricing in general, (ii) a 1 < al, a1 > 0, d1 < o, a2 < a2' a2 > o, 
d2 < 0 and ao > ao together would support dynamic/stochastic models of 
limit pricing, (iii) a 1 = a1 and a 2 = a2 collectively would support the 
static theory of limit pricing, (iv) a 1 = a1 , a 2 = a 2 and a residual 
pattern with large residuals for very high and very low level of entry 
barriers would support the dynamic/deterministic theory, and ( v) a 1 ~ 0, 
a1 ~ o, a2 ~ 0, az ~ o, and ao = ao would suggest a denial of any kind of 
limit pricing behavior. 
The Data 
A description of the variables employed in our study and the data 
sources is provided in the following. 
1. TI~, industry profit rates on total assets for 1976: TI~ = (Annual 
1 1 f d . I d" S D · · tota va ue o pro uct1on - nterme 1ate expenses - eprec1at1on -
Indirect tax - Compensation to labor - Net value of transferred 
expenditures - Compensation to property + Net value of interest) I Total 
assets at the end of the year where Compensation to property = (Net value 
of rent+ Net value of interest). 
2. C , four-firm concentration ratio for 1976: this is the 
t 
conventional four-firm concentration ratio, i.e. the largest four firms' 
shares in total industry sales. Total industry sales include values of 
exports. 
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3. GRt, market growth rate in 1971-1976: this is the percentage 
change in industry total revenue, i.e. 
total revenue in 1976 - total revenue in 1971 
total revenue in 1971 
4. BA, advertising intensity for 1976: it is industrial advertising 
as a percentage of sales multiplied by a convenience goods dummy. 6 It is 
indicated by Porter (1976) that: 
Because other forms of product differentiation activity by 
manufacturers offer little potential, direct advertising to the 
consumer is the dominant form of selling effort by the 
convenience goods manufacturers. As well as leading to product 
differentiation in the eyes of the consumer, advertising 
determines the manufacturer's power vis-a-vis the retailer and 
his ease of access to distribution. Where retailer power is 
high, the manufacturer's rate of return will be bargained down, 
ceteris paribus. Alternate means of product differentiation 
available to the manufacturer are likely to be ineffective. As 
a corollary, advertising is a relatively good measure of 
product differentiation for products sold through convenience 
outlets. 
Advertising acts strongly as a product differentiation barrier in 
convenience goods industries. We thus multiply advertising intensity by 
the convenience goods dummy to capture more closely the role of 
advertising barrier in the determination of industrial profitability. 
5. BST7 , a proxy of economies of scale based on Taiwan data for 
1976: this is the average size of the largest plants accounting for 50 
percent of industry sales divided by domestic market sales. BST is not 
divided by CDR ratio (cost disadvantage ratio) because the CDR data for 
Taiwan manufacturing industries is not available. 
6. BSU 8, a proxy for economies of scale based on U.S. data for 
1976: we first calculate the Comanor and Wilson (1967) proxy for minimum 
efficient scale, i.e. the average size of the least number of plants 
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producing 50 percent of U.S. value of shipments as a percentage of sales. 
Then we scale this measure by multiplying it by the ratio of U.S. value 
of shipments to Taiwan value of shipments, thus we obtain an MES measure 
for Taiwan based on the U.S. market. This scaled estimate is divided by 
u.s. CDR ratio. 
value added per worker of smallest plant 
which account for 50% of employment 
CDR 
value added per worker of largest plant 
which account for 50% of employment 
The measure is thus of the form 
u.s. v.s. 
BS (U.S. MES x ) I u.s. CDR 
Taiwan V.S. 
where V.S. is value of shipments. 
We believe that a U.S. based BS measure (proxy for economies of 
scale) is more accurate than a Taiwan based measure because: (i) due to 
much more smaller markets, most firms in Taiwan's manufacturing sector 
operate at less than minimum efficient scale, but their counterparts in 
the U.S. manufacturing sector do not do so, (ii) the level of technology 
of some Taiwanese manufacturing industries is close to that of its U.S. 
counterparts because of the large presence of U.S. and Japanese 
multinationals, (iii) a statistical reason is that the measurement error 
of a U.S. based BS measure would be less correlated with that for 
concentration, and (iv) lack of CDR data (cost disadvantage ratio) for 
Taiwan manufacturing industries, the Taiwan based BS measure does not 
contain the information about the shape of the average cost curve or the 
diseconomies of scale that come about from operating at an output smaller 
than the minimum efficient scale. 
7. IMP , import intensity for 1976: this is the ratio of current 
t 
import to the sum of industry total sales (including values of exports) 
and current imports. This is used as a proxy for foreign competition. 
8. EXP , export shares for 1976: it is the ratio of exports to 
t 
industry total sales. 
71 
9. G , dummy variable: if 50 percent or more of an industry's total 
t 
sales in 1976 are made by government owned companies, then a value of 1 
is assigned to this industry, otherwise it is zero. 
10. ENT , entry in 1976-1981:9 
t+l 
number of firms in 1981 - number of firms in 1976 
ENT 
t+l number of firms in 1976 
The data employed in our study are derived from the following 
sources: 
1. The Report on 1981 Industrial and Commercial Census, Taiwan 
District, Republic of China: July 1983. Directorate - General of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China. 
2. The Report on 1976 Industrial and Commercial Census, Taiwan 
District, Republic of China: July 1978. Directorate -General of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China. 
3. The Report on 1971 Industrial and Commercial Census, Taiwan 
District, Republic of China: July 1973. Directorate - General of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China. 
4. Custom Import Tariff of the Republic of China, Revised Edition: 
September 1980. Inspectorate General of Customs, Ministry of Finance, 
Republic of China. 
72 
5. Custom Import Tariff of the Republic of China, Revised Edition: 
July 1976. Inspectorate General of Customs, Ministry of Finance, 
Republic of China. 
6. Imported Manufacturing Products, Republic of China Custom 
Statistics, 1981, January - December. 
7. Imported Manufacturing Products, Republic of China Custom 
Statistics, 1976, January - Dececember. Inspectorate General of Customs, 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of China. 
8. Standard Industry Classification, Republic of China, Revised 
Edition: June 1983. Directorate - General of Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China. 
9. Chen, Cheng-Tsang. "A Study on the Industrial Concentration: 
Taiwan District, Republic of China," Quarterly Review of Medium Business 
Bank of Taiwan, Vol.8 (1985), pp. 35-57. 
10. Hsiao, Feng-Hsiung. "Measuring and Analyzing the Industrial 
Concentration: Republic of China," Quarterly Journal of the City Bank of 
Taipei, Vol.13 (1980), PP• 43-56. 
11. U.S. Census of Manufacturers, 1977, Bureau of the Census, U.S. 
Department of Commerce. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1981. 
12. U.S. Census of Manufacturers, 1982, Bureau of the Census, U.S. 
Department of Commerce. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1986. 
There are 134 SIC four-digit manufacturing industries in Taiwan. 
Twenty-three industries are deleted from our sample, because the 
definition of these industries does not satisfy the basic criterion for 
market definition or industry boundary that firms included in an 
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industry produce "close substitutes." [See, Needham (1969), Posner 
(1976), and Boyer (1979).] Thus those industries cannot represent an 
"industry" in an economic analysis. Examples are: other flavoring 
products manufacturing (2059), miscellaneous food preparing manufacturing 
(2099), other knitted apparel manufacturing (2206), and other textiles 
manufacturing (2209). Four industries are not included because of the 
unavailability of concentration data, these are spirits, wine and malt 
(2111), beer malt liquors (2112), railway rolling stock manufacturing and 
repairing (3702), and aircraft manufacturing and repairing (3706). 
Another four industries, slaughtering (2011), wooden furniture and 
fixtures manufacturing (2521), primary iron and steel industries (3311), 
and textile machine manufacturing and repairing (3504), were dropped for 
lack of minimum efficient scale data. Two industries, fur and fur 
products manufacturing (2402), and abrasive materials manufacturing 
(3292), could not be used because of deficient profit data. 
The remaining 103 industries in our sample consist of 49 consumer 
goods industries and 54 producer goods industries. 10 
A subsample consisting of 70 industries is also used. It was 
determined by the number of industries for which we could obtain a proxy 
for minimum efficient scale based on the u.s. data. 
The profit equation, equation (4.12), and the entry equation, 
equation (4.13), will be estimated in two versions: 
Version A: the "103 industries" sample will be used to estimate 
equations (4.12) and (4.13) with a minimum efficient scale proxy (BS) 
based on Taiwan data. 
Version B: the "70 industries" sample will be used to estimate 
equations (4.12) and (4.13) with a BS proxy based on u.s. data, and for 
purposes of comparison the "70 industries" sample will also be used to 




1Geroski's test checks the consistency of the OLS estimates of a 
single equation model. Although he warns that consistency might not 
always imply exogeneity of the variables inquestion. See P. A. Geroski, 
"Simultaneous Equations Models of the Structure-Performance Paradigm," 
European Economic Review, Vol. 19. (1982), pp. 145-158. 
2since a 4 < 0, we have la41 = -a4. If d4 + dg > la41 , then 
d4 + dg > -a4 and thus a 4 + d4 > -d8 • Multiplying both sides of the 
inequalilty by 100 we have 100a4 + 100d4 > -100d8• Adding a8 + d 0 to both sides, we obtain a 0 + d0 + 100a4 + 100d4 > a 0 + d0 - 10 d 8• 
3It is predicted by the theory of dynamic/stochastic limit pricing 
that TI~ is nearly always above nf and both rise with barriers. 
Therefore, TI~ will rise as nf rises. 
4since it is predicted that TI~ will rise and converge to Tit as the 
level of barriers increases. Therefore, TI ~ - TI f at a higher level of 
barriers is smaller than TI~ - Tif at a lower level of barriers. 
5"Intermediate expenses'~ includes costs of raw materials and parts, 
electricity energy and fuel for power and heating, and miscellaneous 
intermediate inputs for production. 
6Porter defines convenience goods as: Goods with relatively low 
unit price, purchased repeatedly, for which the consumer desires an 
easily accessible outlet. Probable gains from making price and quality 
comparisons small relative to consumer's appraisal of search costs. 
7The data for the BS measure is obtained from Tein-Chen Chuo. 
8The advantages of using a proxy based on U.S. data has been 
discussed by Masson and Shaanan (1987): 
If the factor price ratios for Canada are identical to those 
for the u.s.; if a de novo plant in Canada would have the same 
technology used in the U.S.; and if due to smaller Canadian 
markets most firms in some industries operate at less than MES, 
where they do not do so in the u.s., then a U.S. based Bs 
(proxy for economies of scale) measure maybe more accurate than 
a Canadian based measure. If factor prices are not identical, 
••• , a u.s. based measure may not be as accurate but may 
still have an advantage because its measurement error should be 
less correlated with that for concentration. 
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9This particular measure is used because of the availability of 
data. 
10we classified an industry to the consumer-goods category if CGV of 
that industry was equal to or greater than 0.5 in 1976. CGV equals the 
proportion of domestic production less exports going to consumers. 
CHAPTER VI 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this chapter we present and evaluate the empirical results. 
We first present the results of the OLS linear regression equations 
relating profit rates and entry to their determinants. 
Results of a test for recursive identification and a test of limit 
pricing will then be presented. 
The results of the test for endogeneity of some explanatory 
variables in the profit equation will be provided in the following 
section. 
The regression results of profit equations with an interactive term 
and a nonlinear concentration variable are presented in an Appendix. 1 
Actual Profit Equation 
In Table IV and Table V, regressions of actual profits on its 
determinants in version (A) and version (B) are presented. 
The coefficients of these variables have the predicted signs except 
for exports and the economies of scale proxy based on Taiwan data (BST). 
Concentration, advertising and the government participation dummy 
variable are the most significant explanatory variables. The coefficient 
estimates of concentration are all significant at the 99 percent level in 










N = 103 
N = number 
TABLE II 
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF PROFIT RATE AND 
DETERMINANTS OF PROFIT RATE 
(VERSION A) 
TI c BA BST GR IMP EXP 
1.00 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.14 -0.09 -0.02 
1.00 0.09 0.41 -0.15 0.18 -0.25 
1.00 -0.09 -0.12 -0.05 -0.18 
1.00 -0.24 -0.20 0.07 























N = number 
TABLE III 
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF PROFIT RATE AND 
DETERMINANTS OF PROFIT RATE 
(VERSION B) 
'IT c BA BSU GR IMP EXP 
1.00 0.35 0.25 0.22 0.01 -0.10 -0.12 
1.00 0.12 0.26 -0.19 0.19 -0.23 
1.00 0.18 -0.13 -0.06 -0.24 
1.00 -0.04 0.30 -0.14 















REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF PROFIT RATES (VERSION A) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TI 


















R.2 0 0 777 5 
F 45.993 
N 103 
t ratios are given in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 
90%, 95%, and 99% level respectively with a one tail test. 
N = number of observations. 
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TABLE V 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF PROFIT RATES (VERSION B) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TI 
Equation Number 2a 
Constant 1.4372 
















-2 R 0.1712 
F 3.036 
N 70 
t ratios are given in parentheses. 
*, ** and*** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 
90%, 95%, and 99% level respectively with a one tail test. 
N = number of observations. 
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variable is significant at the 95 percent level in version (A) and the 90 
percent level in version (B). The government participation dummy is 
significant at the 99 percent level in version (A) and the 90 percent 
level in version (B). 
A one percentage point increase in concentration causes about a 0.05 
percentage point increase in actual profit rates. A 1.25 percentage 
point increase in advertising would result in a one percentage point 
increase in actual profit rates. Public enterprises exert a 
significantly negative influence on industrial profitability. 
Growth is significant at the 99 percent level in version (A) and the 
import variable is significant at the 95 percent level in version (B) but 
they are not significant in version (B) and in version (A) respectively. 
Growth seems to have a positive effect on actual profits and imports seem 
to have a negative one. 
The economies of scale variable based on U.S. data (BSU) is 
significant at the 90 percent level in version (B) while the same 
variable based on Taiwan data (BST) is not significant in version (A). 
The simple correlation (see Table II) between concentration and economies 
of scale (BST) was high in version (A). The weakness of BST in 
explaining profits may be attributed in part to multicollinearity. Other 
nonstatistical disadvantages of using it as a proxy for economies of 
scale in Taiwan manufacturing industries have been discussed in Chapter 
v. 
Our results for the export variable are inconclusive. It displays a 
positive sign in version (A), but a negative one in version (B). In both 
versions the coefficient estimates for this variable are not significant. 
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A regression on the 70 industries subsample with the BS proxy based 
on Taiwan data, provided weaker results. (See Table XX.) Imports and 
government participation were found to be insignificant. BST had an 
expected positive sign, but it was not significant. The correlation 
between BST and concentration was also high in this subsample. 
Therefore, the insignificance of the coefficient estimate of BST seemed 
to be caused by the collinearity between BST and industry concentration. 
Previewing our results for the entry equations, we find that our 
full sample results for the entry equations as well as the profit 
equations are generally better than those obtained from the subsample 
regressions. 
Since the weaker results are generally qualitatively consistent with 
our full sample results, the weaker fit of our subsample regressions seem 
to be caused by sample selection rather than from sensitivity to variable 
definitions between BST and BSU. We also tried regressions on the 70 
industries subsample with the BS proxy based on Taiwan data, i.e. in 
version (B/BST). Results obtained from regressions in version (B/BST) 
are generally weaker than those in version (B) and version (A). The 
weaker fit of regressions in version (B/BST) than those obtained in 
version (A) seem to suggest that the weaker results in version (B/BST) 
are caused by sample selection. 
Results obtained in version (B/BST) for profit equations 
strenthening our findings that concentration and advertising are 
significant and important structural characteristics in Taiwan's 
manufacturing sector. 
Heteroscedasticity, with a pattern characterized by large variance 
of the residuals in the smaller industries was detected in some previous 
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profit studies [e.g. Comanor and Wilson (1967), Esposito and Esposito 
(1971) and Harris (1973)]. The Goldfeld and Quandt test was used to 
determine whether heteroscedasticity is a problem in our estimations. 
(Industries were ranked according to total sales for 1976.) With 33 
degrees of freedom we could not reject heteroscedasticity at the 95 
percent level in version (A). We correct for heteroscedasticity by using 
a weighted regression. The weight being used is total sales to the one 
fourth. With 20 degrees of freedom, heteroscedasticity was rejected at 
the 99 percent level in version (B). 
In order to find whether our results were sensitive to the choice of 
different variable definitions. We used two alternative definitions of 
concentration. 
First, we considered the possibility that concentration ratios may 
understate the level of market power of leading firms in Taiwanese 
manufacturing industries and should be adjusted to reflect market 
realities, because (1) four-digit industries may be too broadly defined 
in Taiwan, (2) meaningful markets for some products are regional or local 
rather than nationwide, and (3) in some industries public enterprises are 
protected by the government. Therefore, we tested profit equations with 
a nonlinear concentration variable, i.e. the square of Ct. The nonlinear 
2 
concentration variable, Ct, appeared to be a strong explanatory variable 
in profit equations. Results for other variables were very similar to 
those derived from the linear specifications. (See Tables XIII, XIV, and 
XV for details.) 
Second, since values of exports in some industries are very large, 
the concentration ratio may not reflect accurately the domestic market 
power exerted by leading firms. We therefore tried an interactive term 
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for concentration and exports which is obtained by multiplying Ct by 
(1 - EXPt) in our profit equations. Estimation with this interactive 
term improved the explanatory power of BST and BSU. BST has the expected 
positive sign and is significant at the 95 percent level in version (A). 
This improvement seems to be a result of the elimination of the 
collinearity between concentration and BST. (See Tables XVI, XVII, and 
XVII for details.) 
Following Pugel (1980) we also tried an interactive model. Results 
obtained are generally not significant. 
In summary, our most striking finding is the strong effect of 
advertising and the government participation variable on industry 
profits. Advertising intensity, as a proxy for product differentiation, 
is found to be an important structural variable influencing industry 
profits positively in the 20 convenience goods industries in Taiwan's 
manufacturing sector. Government participation is seen to affect 
industry profits negatively as we expected. The significant positive 
sign of the concentration variable suggests that increases in industry 
concentration do result in greater industry profits in Taiwanese 
manufacturing industries. 
Growth displays the expected positive sign. Imports with their 
consistently negative impact on profits, may lead to more competitive 
pricing in domestic markets and consequently a lower profit rate. The 
export variable is insignificant in all cases. The economies of scale 
variable is sensitive to model specification and measurement. The 
positive and significant sign of BSU suggests that our measurement of the 







N = 103 
TABLE VI 
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF ENTRY AND THE 
DETERMINANTS OF ENTRY 
(VERSION A) 
ENT 'TT c BA BST 
1.00 0.19 0.22 -0.11 0.20 
1.00 0.20 0.20 0.10 
1.00 0.09 0.41 
1.00 -0.09 
1.00 















N = 70 
N = number 
TABLE VII 
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF ENTRY AND THE 
DETERMINANTS OF ENTRY 
(VERSION B) 
ENT 'IT c BA BST 
1.00 0.30 0.37 -0.14 0.03 
1.00 0.35 0.25 0.22 






















REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ENTRY (VERSION A): 


















t ratios are given in parentheses. 
88 
*, **, and *** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 
90%, 95%, and 99% level respectively with a one tail test (a two-tailed 
test, if a "t" follows the coefficient estimate ). 











REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ENTRY (VERSION B): 


















t ratios are given in parentheses. 
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*, **, and *** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 
90%, 95%, and 99% level respectively with a one tail test (a two-tailed 
test, if a "t" follows the coefficient estimate). 
N = number of observations. 
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Entry Equation 
The results of regressions of the percentage change in firm numbers 
(ENT) on the determinants of entry are presented in Table VIII and Table 
IX. The explanatory variables included in our entry equations are 
concentration, advertising, economies of scale (BST and BSU), growth and 
pre-entry profit rates. 
The pre-entry profits variable and the advertising variable have the 
expected signs. The pre-entry profit rate appeared to be a strong 
predictor of the change of firm numbers. It is significant at the 90 
percent level in versions (A) and (B). A one percentage point change in 
the pre-entry profit rate results in about a three percentage point 
increase in the percentage change in firm numbers in the 1976-1981 period 
in Taiwan Manufacturing sector. Advertising also shows up as a strong 
and significant predictor of ENT. A one percentage point increase in the 
advertising intensity reduces the entry rate by about 14 percentage 
points. It is significant at the 95 percent level in version (A) and the 
90 percent level in version (B), thus suggesting that advertising is a 
barrier to entry in the convenience goods industries in Taiwan. 
The coefficient of concentration has a positive sign and is 
significant at 95 percent level (two-tailed test) in version (B) and the 
90 percent level (two-tailed test) in version (A). It appears that in 
Taiwan's manufacturing sector during the period 1976-1981 high 
concentration induced entry and potential entrants found concentrated 
industries to be more attractive. In version (A) and (B), growth has 
the expected positive sign but it is not significant. The regression 
coefficient for the economies of scale variable (BSU) displays the 
expected negative sign in version (B). But the coefficient of BST in 
version (A) has a positive sign. The coefficient estimates of BST and 
BSU are insignificant in the two versions. 
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We also ran a regression with BST on the 70 industries subsample for 
the entry equation. The regression resulted a weaker fit. BST was 
insignificant with a wrong sign. Results for other variables were 
similar to those obtained in version (B). (See Table XXII for details.) 
An examination of the residuals from the entry equations in version 
(A) and (B) (observations are ranked in ascending order of firm numbers) 
suggests the possibility of heteroscedasticity as larger residuals are 
associated with industries with small firm numbers and smaller residuals 
with industries with large firm numbers. 
The Goldfeld and Quandt test was used to determine whether the 
variances of the residuals for industries with smaller firm numbers was 
greater. With 35 degrees of freedom in version (A) and 25 degrees of 
freedom in version (B), hetroscedasticity can not be rejected at the 95 
percent level. 
Weighted by the firm numbers to the one fourth, heteroscedasticity 
is corrected for entry equations in version (B). We failed to correct it 
for the entry equation in version (A) by applying weights based on firm 
numbers. Weights based on profit rates eliminate heteroscedasticity. We 
did not use it because it is correlated with the residuals from the 
profit equation and the sufficient condition for recursive identification 
is that residuals from the profit equation and the entry equation are 
uncorrelated. We present only the unadjusted results in Table VIII. 
Although inconsistent, these results are unbiased. 
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In summary, the coefficients for the profit varaiable, the advertising 
variable, and the concentration variable are all significant and have the 
hypothesized signs. The results suggests that in Taiwan's manufacturing 
sector a high profit rate would attract entry, that advertising is an 
effective barrier to entry and that high concentration is an inducement 
to entry. The results obtained for the economies of scale variable are 
inconclusive. Growth seems to have no effect on entry. 
Test of the Recursive Identification 
The sufficient condition for the identification of our recursive 
model is COV[n(t+1), E(t)] = 0. Theoretically, we expect that entry in 
period t+1 has no effect on the actual profit rate in period t and the 
actual profit rate in period t has a positive effect on entry in period 
t+l. The recursive identification is thus expected to be satisfied. We 
regressed the residuals from the profit equation on the residuals from 
the entry equation and found that Et and nt+1 are not correlated. 
The recursive identification is demonstrated and the OLS procedure 
is therefore appropriate for the estimation of our model. 
A Test of Limit Pricing 
The results of a test of limit pricing are presented in Table X and 
Table XI. We converted the entry equations to the entry forestalling 
profit equations by setting ENTt+1 = 0 and solving for profits. 
The entry equations presented in Table VIII and Table IX are 
ENTt+1 = 11.4852 + 3.2874 TI~ + 0.5076 Ct - 14.1451 BA 
+ 19.7649 BST + 0.0205 GRt (Version A) 
a 
4.68410 + 3.6536 Tit + 0.9036 C - 15.4655 BA 
- 0.05720 BSU + 0.0096 GRt (Version B) 
Setting ENTt+1 = 0 and moving TI to the left hand side of the 
equation we have the entry forestalling profit equation, 
-3.2874 Tit= 11.4852 + 0.5076 C - 14.1451 BA + 19.7649 BST 
+ 0.0205 GR (Version A) 
-3.6536 Tit 4.68410 + 0.9036 Ct - 15.4655 BA - 0.05720 BSU 
+ 0.0096 GRt (Version B) 
The entry forestalling profit equations are therefore estimated to 
be: 
-3.4937 - 0.1544 C + 4.30280 BA- 6.0123 BST- 0.0062 GR 
(Version A) t t 
TI~ -1.2821 - 0.2473 Ct + 4.23290 BA + 0.0157 BSU -0.0026 GRt 
(Version B) 
From Tables X and XI we see that advertising is again a strong and 
significant predictor in explaining TI~. In all versions, a one 
percentage point increase in advertising would raise the entry 
forestalling profit rates by about 4.3 percentage points (i.e. without 
the risk of inducing entry). It is significant at the 95 percent level 
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in version (A) and the 90 percent level in version (B). The significance 
level of the coefficient estimates was derived from Fieller's Theorem as 
presented in Zerbe (1978). We obtained significance levels but not the 
explicit t values from the test for ratios. 
Concentration has an adverse effect on Tif• The negative coefficient 
t 
for the concentration variable is significant at the 95 percent level in 









































t ratios are given in parentheses •. 
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*, **, and *** indicates coefficient is statistically significartt at the 
90%, 95%, and 99% level respectively with a one tail test. 
N = number of observations. 
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t ratios are given in parentheses. 
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f 0 














*, **, and *** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 
90%, 95%, and 99% level respectively with a one tail test. 
N = number of observations. 
N.A. means "not applicable". 
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Since high concentration induces entry, the higher the concentration 
ratio is the lower the incumbent's entry forestalling profit rate could 
be. Our results indicate that a one percentage point increase in 
concentration would lower the entry forestalling profit rate by about 0.2 
percentage point. 
The role of the economies of scale variable in the entry 
forestalling profit equation is not clear. It is significant at the 95 
percent level in the two versions, but only in version (B) does it have 
the expected sign. The wrong signs in version (A) may be attributed to 
the collinearity between BST and C • The negative coefficient for the 
t 
growth variable is significant at the 95 percent level in version (B), 
but not significant in version (A). Our results suggests that growth in 
Taiwan's manufacturing sector may have a weak effect on the entry 
forestalling profit rate. 
The actual profit equations in Tables IV and V were converted to the 
optimal profit equations by setting Ct = 100 to obtain TI~· 
Setting Ct = 100, we have 
TI~ = 7.3285 + 0.8781 BA- 0.3957 BST + 0.003 GRt 
+ 0.0076 EXP - 3.3644 G (Version A) 
t t 
- 0.0002 IMP 
t 
TI~ 7.6472 + 0.6480 BA- 0.0195 BSU + 0.0015 GRt- 0.007 IMPt 
- 0.0029 EXPt- 2.7336 Gt (Version B) 
In Tables X and XI the coefficient estimates of the entry 
forestalling profit equations are compared with the coefficient estimates 
of the optimal profit equations. The advertising barrier coefficients in 
the entry forestalling profit equations are all positive and all greater 
than coefficients of the same variable in the optimal profit equations. 
The economies of scale variable does not appear as an effective entry 
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barrier. It has inconsistent signs in the two estimating versions. In 
·accordance with expectations the intercept terms of the entry 
forestalling profit equations are all smaller than the constants of the 
optimal profit equations. 
A test for comparing the relative values of the coefficients in the 
entry forestalling profit equations and the coefficients in the optimal 
profit equations is also presented. The difference between the two 
intercept terms is significant at the 95 percent level in version (B) and 
the 90 percent level in version (A). The difference between the 
advertising barrier coefficients in the Tif equation and the n° equation 
t t 
is not significant in version (A) while it is significant at the 90 
percent level in version (B). The differences between the coefficients 
of the economies of scale variable are all insignificant. 
Our results of: (1) significantly different intercept coefficients 
for the Tif equations and the n° equations, (2) significant and positive 
t t 
slopes of advertising barriers in both Tif and n° equations, and 
t t 
(3) significantly greater intercept coefficients and advertising barrier 
coefficients for the optimal profit equations, jointly provide support 
for the stochastic-dynamic limit pricing theory which states that n° is 
t 
always above Tif, both rise with barriers and finally converge at the 
t 
short run profit maximizing level. The hypothesis of the dual effect of 
the advertising barrier on the actual profit rate is also confirmed by 
the above findings. (See Table XII for details.) 
The negative and mostly significant coefficients of concentration in 
the entry forestalling profit equations and the significantly positive 
coefficients in the actual profit equations provide support for the 
hypothesis of a dual effect of concentration on the actual profit rate. 
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The hypothesis of a dual effect of growth on the actual profit rate 
is not supported by our results. 
Test of Endogeneity 
A test developed by Engle, Hendry and Richard (1979) and first used 
in an Industrial Organization study by Geroski (1983) was applied to 
determine whether simultaneity exists between profit rates, 
concentration, advertising, imports and exports. We could not reject the 
hypothesis that concentration, advertising, imports and exports are all 
exogenous in the profit equation with acalculated F = 1.1045 which is 
smaller than critical (at 95 percent significance level) F(4,19) 2.49. 
Therefore, our single equation specification is appropriate for 
estimating the determinants of profits. 
Theoretical 
Expectations 
If af • 8i + df ( 0, 
af < 0, and af - ai - 0. 
We would reject limit 
pricing behavior. 
If af • Sf + df • Sf, 
af ~ Sf > o, 
We would accept the static model. 
If ai ~ af + df • Sf, 
af ~ af > 0, 
and a residual pattern with 
high positive residuals 
for very high and very low 
values of the entry barriers. 
We would accept the dynamic/ 
deterministic model. 
If ai D Sf + df < Sf, 
af ~ af > o, df < O, 
a(j > ao. 
We would accept the dynamic/ 
stochastic models of limit pricing. 
TABLE XII 
A TEST OF LIMIT PRICING 
Empirical Findings 
(Version A) 
a1 ~ 0.8781 > o, 
a1 • 4.3028 > o, 
a2 • -0.3957 < o, 
82 - -6.0123 < o, 
ao - ~ - 10.8222 i o. 
a1 - 0.8781 ~ 81 a 4.3028, 
a2 - -0.3957 f 82 - -6.0123, 
a1 • 0.8781 ~ a1 • 4.3028, 
a2 ~ -0.3957 ~ a2 • -6.0123, 
We did not find a residual 
pattern as mentioned left 
hand side. 
a1 • 0.8781 < a1 - 4.3028, 
a2 • -0.3957 > a2 - -6.0123, 
a1 • 0.8781 > o, 
d1 - -3.4247 < o, 
a2 • -0.3957 < o, 
d2 - 5.6166 > o, 
a0 - 7.3285 > a0 = -3.4937, 
Empirical Findings 
(Version B) 
a1 - 0.6480 > o, 
81 - 4.2329 > 0, 
a2 = 0.0195 > o, 
a~ • 0.0157 > 0, 
au - so = 8.9293 f o. 
al - 0.6480 ~ a1 - 4.2329, 
a2- 0.0195 ~ a2 ~ 0.0157, 
a1 - 0.6480 ~ a1 = 4.2329, 
a2- 0.0195 ~ a2 ~ 0.0157, 
We did not find a residual 
pattern as mentioned left 
hand side. 
a1 - 0.6480 < a1 - 4.2329, 
U2- 0.0195 > a2 = 0.0157, 
a1 = 0.0648 > o, 
d1 - -3.5849 < o, 
a2 = 0.0195 > o, 
d2 = o.oo4 > o, 
a~ • 7.6472 >a = -1.2821, 
0 0 
Conclusions 
Rejection of limiting pricing 
is unwarranted. 
We reject the existence of limit 
pricing behavior suggested by the 
static model. 
We reject the existence of limit 
pricing behavior suggested by the 
dynamic/deterministic model. 
We accept dynamic/stochastic models 
of limit pricing. 





See Tables XIII through XVIII for details. 
2 We obtain the optimal profit equations by setting Ct = 100 in the 
actual profit equations and adding it to the intercept term. Therefore, 
Ct will not appear in the optimal profit equations. 
3since we convert the entry equations to the entry forestalling 
equations by setting ENTt+1 = 0 and solving for profits, variables which 
are not included in the entry equations will consequently not be in the 
entry forestalling profit equations. 
100 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The major purpose of this study has been to test empirically the 
structure-performance relationship, especially the theory of limit 
pricing, in Taiwan manufacturing sector. 
Based on Masson and Shaanan's statistical approach, we constructed a 
simultaneous equation system which includes a profit equation and an 
entry equation to test, from both the existing firms' side and the 
potential entrants' side: (1) the conventional structure-performance 
relationship, i.e. the determination of industry profits in Taiwan 
manufacturing industries, and (2) the determination of the rate of entry 
into those industries. 
The results obtained provide support for the hypothesized 
relationship between industry profits and several traditional structural 
variables. As an entry barrier, advertising intensity exerts a positive 
and significant influence on industrial profitability. Concentration 
also has a strong and positive effect on profits. Growth has a weak 
positive effect on profits. An economies of scale measure based on u.s. 
data (BSU), influences profits significantly and positively. The 
insignificant and negative signs of the coefficients of the minimum 
efficient scale measure based on Taiwan data (BST) may be attributed to 
the collinearity between BST and industrial concentration. 
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The results for international trade variables are as expected. 
Import competition is theoretically expected to limit domestic market 
power and thus constrain domestic industry profits to a more competitive 
level and the empirical results indeed confirm this although the effect 
is weak. The role of exports in determining domestic industry profits 
is, however, not clear. 
Public enterprises, as expected have a negative and significant 
influence on industry profit .rates. 
Statistical results pertaining to the determination of the rate of 
entry into Taiwan manufacturing industries indicate that profits as 
predicted by conventional microeconomic theory have a significantly 
positive relationship with entry. Advertising intensity has a 
significantly negative effect on the entry of domestic firms into 
convenience goods industries. Convenience goods industries with higher 
advertising intensity experience less entry. This leads us to conclude 
that the advertising barrier does exist in the Taiwan manufacturing 
sector. However, economies of scale can not be deemed as an entry 
barrier. It is not a significant explanatory factor in the entry 
equation. 
The advertising barrier has the expected positive and significant 
sign in the entry forestalling profit equation which is derived from the 
entry equation. It can be interpreted to mean that an increase in the 
height of the advertising barrier would allow existing firms to charge 
higher prices without the risk of entry. 
A test of limit pricing behavior was conducted by comparing and 
testing variables in the optimal profit equations and the entry 
forestalling profit equations. The coefficient estimates of the 
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advertising barrier in the entry forestalling profit equations are all 
significant and greater than their counterparts in the optimal profit 
equations. The intercepts in the entry forestalling profit equations 
were all significantly smaller than the intercepts in the optimal profit 
equations. These results provide some support for the idea that in 
Taiwan's manufacturing industries, existing firms adopt limit pricing 
policies. 
The significant and positive effect of concentration on entry 
indicates that potential entrants find highly concentrated industries to 
be more appealing. The effect of concentration on the entry forestalling 
profit rate was significantly negative. 
Although mostly insignificant, growth had correct signs in all 
equations and influenced the entry forestalling profit rates 
significantly and negatively. 
We may conclude that since growth and concentration induce entry, 
with an increase in growth or concentration, existing firms would have to 
charge lower prices to prevent entry. 
Our statistical evidence provides a fair amount of support for the 
theory of limit pricing. Empirical findings suggest: (1) allocative 
efficiency is distorted by the exertion of market power (concentration) 
in Taiwan manufacturing sector; (2) in convenience goods industries 
advertising intensity is a significant barrier to entry; (3) profits 
induce entry; (4) entrants are attracted to concentrated industries; 
(5) imports have a mild disciplining effect on domestic markets; 
(6) government participation in manufacturing industries has a negative 
influence on industry profits; and (7) limit pricing behavior of the type 
proposed by dynamic/stochastic models may exist in Taiwan's 
manufacturing sector, especially in the convenience goods industries. 
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The impact of concentration on industrial profitability appears to 
be strong in Taiwan's manufacturing sector. It seems that a government 
monitoring of concentrated industries along the lines of western 
antitrust agencies might be called for to maintain a competitive 
environment. But one also has to remember that Taiwanese exporting firms 
are competing with. giant foreign firms and confront very competitive 
prices in the world market, and the pressure from world markets ensure to 
some extent that Taiwan's industries remain competitive. The government 
also cannot adopt deconcentration policies, instead it needs to encourage 
large scale private firms in order to expand exports and maintain 
economic prosperity. 
It is found by Masson and Shaanan (1984) that the existence of both 
actual and potential competition in a market has the effect of offsetting 
the potential of full monopoly welfare losses. Therefore, in the short 
run a limit pricing policy could be socially beneficial. But its long 
run effect is not clear and hence government intervention against limit 
pricing in the convenience goods industries is not warranted. However, 
government intervention is suggested to curb advertising activities which 
aim to deter entry into those industries. 
The negative relationship between government participation and 
industrial profitability does not imply a pro-competitive effect of the 
existence of public enterprises. It is indicated by Chou (1986) that 
high prices are adopted by public enterprises and protected by the 
government, therefore lower profit rates in the pubic sector are 
obviously a sign of a wasteful use of economic resources which causes 
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high production costs and shrink price-cost margins, rather than a sign 
of competition. 
Our study has some policy implications. First, since import 
discipline improves allocation performance in Taiwan, further 
liberalization of tariff and import controls would create a more 
competitive industrial environment and enhance consumer welfare. Second, 
consumer welfare can be further improved by transfering more public 
enterprises, except those in the "strategic industries", to private 
ownership. Third, entry into the convenience goods industries should be 
facilitated to help overcome advertising barriers, if possible, to 
enhance competition. 
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*, **, and *** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 
90%, 95%, and 99% level respectively with a one tail test. 
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*, **, and*** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 
90%, 95%, and 99% level respectively with a one tail test. 
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*, **, and *** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 
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A PROFIT EQUATION WITH AN INTERACTIVE TERM FOR 
CONCENTRATION AND EXPORTS (VERSION A): 
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*, **, and *** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 
90%, 95%, and 99% level respectively with a one tail test. 















A PROFIT EQUATION WITH AN INTERACTIVE TERM FOR 
CONCENTRATION AND EXPORTS (VERSION B): 
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*, **, and *** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 
90%, 95%, and 99% level respectively with a one tail test. 















A PROFIT EQUATION WITH AN INTERACTIVE TERM FOR 
CONCENTRATION AND EXPORTS (VERSION B/BST): 






















t ratios are given in parentheses. 
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*, **, and *** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 
90%, 95%, and 99% level respectively with a one tail test. 













SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF PROFIT RATE AND THE 
DETERMINANTS OF PROFIT RATE (VERSION B/BST) 
'IT c BA BST GR IMP EXP 
1.00 0.35 0.25 0.19 0.01 -0.10 -0.12 
1.00 0.12 0.38 -0.19 0.19 -0.23 
1.00 -0.12 -0.13 -0.06 -0.24 
1.00 -0.27 -0.21 0.13 
1.00 0.06 0.18 
1.00 -0.13 
1.00 













REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF PROFIT RATES (VERSION B/BST): 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TI 






















t ratios are given in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 
90%, 95%, and 99% level respectively with a one tail test. 







N = 70 
TABLE XXI 
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF ENTRY AND THE 
DETERMINANTS OF ENTRY (VERSION B/BST) 
ENT 'IT c BA BST 
1.00 0.30 0.37 -0.14 0.24 
1.00 0.35 0.25 0.19 
1.00 0.12 0.38 
1.00 -0.12 
1.00 










REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ENTRY (VERSION B/BST): 





























*, **, and *** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 
90%, 95% and 99% level respectively with a one tail test (a two-tailed 
test, if a "t" follows the coefficient estimate). 
N = number of observations. 
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TABLE XXIII 
RESULTS FOR A TEST OF LIMIT PRICING (VERSION B/BST) 
Dependent Variable f 0 f 0 'ITt 'IT 'ITt - 'ITt t 
Constant -0.2029 8.2133 -8.4162 
(4.73)*** (-1.6114)* 
c -0.2714 ** N.A. N.A. 
BA 4.6097 ** 0.8792 3.7305 
( 1. 71)** ( 1.1391) 
BST -6.0123 ** 0.6641 -6.6764 
(0.68) (-0.8310) 
GR -0.0048 * 0.0018 -0.0066 
( 1.09) (-0.7523) 
IMP N.A. -0.0044 N.A. 
(-1.08) 
EXP N.A. -0.0056 N.A. 
(-0.38) 
G N.A. -2.2111 N.A. 
(-1.27) 
N 70 70 70 
t ratios are given in parentheses. 
*, **, and*** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 
90%, 95%, and 99% level respectively with a one tail test. 
N = number of observations. 
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